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Through Their EYES

Factors Affecting Muslim Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror

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To Kathleen, Joey and Geo

Contents

PREFACE, 1

Chapter 1 – Current Perspectives on U.S. International Public Diplomacy Policy In Light of Negative Public Opinion of the U.S. among Muslim Populations Abroad, 5

Chapter 2 – A Review and Integration of the Research on International Public Opinion Formation and Variation: Proposing a Conceptual Model of Muslim Public Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 39

Chapter 3 – From Conceptual to Operational: Methodology for Testing a Model of Muslim Public Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 85

Chapter 4 – Factors Affecting Lebanese Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 122

Chapter 5 – Factors Affecting Egyptian Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 172

Chapter 6 – Factors Affecting Turkish Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 216

Chapter 7 – Factors Affecting Pakistani Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 260

Chapter 8 – Factors Affecting Indonesian Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 309

Chapter 9 – Factors Affecting Nigerian Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 365

Chapter 10 – Factors Affecting Senegalese Muslims' Support for the U.S.-led War on Terror: Socio-Cultural Context and Model Testing Results, 411

Chapter 11 – Implications for Theory: A Final Predictive Model of International Public Opinion of Muslim Populations about the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 456

Chapter 12 – Implications for Prioritizing Public Diplomacy Strategies to Increase Muslim Public Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror and Agenda of Future Research, 478

APPENDIX, 500

INDEX, 519

ABOUT THE AUTHOR, 528

Preface

If you could see the same object through someone else's eyes, would the object appear the same way as you see it through your own eyes? Do they see the same aspects of the object that you see? What if the object was an abstract concept, would the concept as seen through their eyes be similar to the concept as you see it? This book uses theory-driven quantitative research methods for tackling a timely topic that is traditionally approached using argumentation, political theory, rhetoric, and other normative ways. The topic at the center of this book is how Muslim populations living outside the United States see the U.S.-led war on terror.

The unit of analysis in this book is the Muslim citizen living in selected countries with substantial Muslim populations. This book seeks to understand why the probability of support for the U.S.-led war on terror varies among citizens within and across the following countries: Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Senegal. The ultimate questions that this book will answer are: What are the factors that drive the probability of support for the U.S.-led war on terror among Muslim populations? What structure can best describe the interrelationships among these factors of influence and best illustrate the interrelationships between these factors and an individual's likelihood to support or oppose the U.S.-led war on terror? Objectively describing this overall structure is important since it is currently our only way to look through the eyes of Muslim populations and find out how they "see" the U.S.-led war on terror.

The data used in this book are drawn from a large-scale survey of international attitudes undertaken by a major research organization and made available to academic researchers for re-analysis. This book applies theory-driven structural equation modeling techniques

to a selected portion of the survey data corresponding to the countries listed above to identify a set of factors that account for the variation in individuals' likelihood to support the U.S.-led war on terror. By modeling these factors, this book will:

1. Develop an empirically-driven theory of international public opinion formation;
2. Pinpoint areas of priority in the realm of U.S. public diplomacy;
3. Contribute to the development of effective U.S. public diplomacy and international communication policies for the coming decade.

WHY THIS BOOK?

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of 9/11/01, the U.S. Government declared a global war on terror. Simultaneously, there was an urgent need for an explanation for the hatred that triggered these attacks. In an attempt to find such an explanation, researchers, policy-makers, and U.S. government officials turned to international public opinion polls to uncover the general attitudes of populations abroad toward the United States. These descriptive public opinion polls showed a generally negative attitude of Muslim populations abroad toward the United States and the U.S.-led war on terror. As a result, the U.S. Congress began seeking the advice of international experts to determine what can be done to change the detected negative public opinion patterns. While the recommendations made by experts were plentiful, there was no objective mechanism for prioritizing certain recommendations over others. In order to truly determine what needs to be done, researchers need to first understand how the United States and the U.S.-led war on terror are perceived in the minds of Muslim individuals living abroad.

Understanding perception, in this context, is different than simply describing one's opinion about a specific subject matter. The difference between the two is best explained through an analogy using a common American concept. Let's take for example, the concept: "the fourth of July." It is useful to find out how Americans feel about the fourth of July and we can do so by quantitatively describing whether they like or dislike this annual holiday. However, in order to truly understand their liking and disliking of

this holiday, we need to uncover what the fourth of July conjures up in their minds. In other words, we need to uncover the cognitive building blocks that, altogether, conjure up the concept "fourth of July" in their minds. Such cognitive building blocks might consist of "fireworks," "burgers," "hot dogs," "family," "warm weather," etc. It is the interrelationships among these cognitive components that result in the liking or disliking of the fourth of July. Researchers tend to use the term "schema" to describe the cognitive structure associated with a particular social concept.

Similarly, in order to truly understand how Muslim individuals living abroad feel about the "U.S.-led war on terror," we need to uncover the components of the schema associated with this concept and then detail the interrelationships among this concept's schema components. It is only then that we would truly understand what prompts the variation in Muslim public opinion toward the concept in question, thus allowing us to determine what might create a positive Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror. This book sets out to do just that.

The main objectives of this book are:

1. To develop a theory of international Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror, and
2. To prioritize actionable public diplomacy and international communication recommendations based on theory-driven empirical analyses.

WHO WILL LIKELY READ THIS BOOK?

This book is intended to be read by students, researchers, policymakers, and government officials interested in public diplomacy, international communication, international psychology, political science, public opinion, and/or international relations. It can be used as a textbook for relevant courses in this area. It can also be used as a reference for others interested in applying its techniques for furthering knowledge in this subject area.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The social psychological approach I used in this book for studying international relations and communication was inspired by *International Behavior: a Social Psychological Analysis*, a book edited by Herbert Kelman and published in 1965 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. My use of applied quantitative analyses for problem solving is credited to the great influence the late John E. Hunter of Michigan State University had on my formative methodological training. His teachings about confirmatory approaches to factor analysis and path analysis have had a lasting imprint on my brain. He gets the credit for teaching me what I know, but I am solely responsible for interpreting his teachings and applying what I know to the topic at hand and for any criticism this application may generate.

I hope that this book is just the beginning, and that other researchers are inspired and/or challenged by it, thus prompting their future work to strive towards perfecting its methodological approach, and improving upon its findings and recommendations.

With respect to the collection of literature used in this book, I would like to thank the many graduate students who conducted database searches and helped organize information for use in the various chapters, including: Kristen Dickson, Kathryn Yontef, Savannah Zoeller, Laura Flynn, Jing Zhang, Joanna Janda, and Kenan Merey. I would like to especially thank Christopher Aswad, Sarina Dahukey and Sara Al-Tukhaim who served as my lead research assistants on this project.

I am grateful to my wife, Kathleen, who has been unconditionally supportive of the countless hours I spent developing this book over a period of 4 years.

CHAPTER

1

Current Perspectives on U.S. Public Diplomacy Policy In Light of Negative Public Opinion of the U.S. among Muslim Populations Abroad

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11) were followed by a U.S. declaration of a global war on terror and a call for the world to join this war (see Perlez, 2001). In political and academic circles, the months that followed the terrorist attacks also witnessed unprecedented attention to the topics of international public opinion and public diplomacy (see Committee on International Relations, 2001a and 2001b; Brumberg, 2002; Ross, 2002; Telhami, 2002).

The focus of attention on international public opinion was driven by the need to understand how people living abroad feel about the United States and the desire to gauge the prevalence of extreme negative feelings towards the United States. Knowing how widespread these extreme negative feelings are was especially important given that the individuals carrying out the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were Muslim foreign nationals, from more than one country, who were united by their harboring of an intense hatred toward the United States (Epstein, 2005). Results of public opinion polls conducted abroad by the Gallup Organization, the Pew Center for the People and the Press, and the Zogby International organization showed a consistent overall negative attitude toward the United States in countries with a substantial Muslim population (Stone,

2002; Pew Center for the People and the Press, 2002; Telhami, 2003). More troubling, according to researchers Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, of the Rand Corporation, were the public opinion patterns among the populations of "ostensible" American allies like Saudi Arabia, 16% of whom held a positive view of the United States, and Kuwait, from which slightly over a quarter of respondents held a favorable view of the United States (Wolf and Rosen, 2005, pp. 63-64). Thomas Kean, who at the time served as Chairman of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (more commonly known as the 9-11 Commission), presented an alarming assessment of foreign public opinion toward the United States:

> Support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people thought the United States was doing the right thing in its fight against terrorism. By 2003, polls showed that 'the bottom has fallen out' of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread… Since last summer, favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Muslims in Nigeria (Kean and Gorelick, 2004, p. 4).

In the minds of U.S. policymakers, the topics of international public opinion and support for the war on terror are clearly linked:

> Today there is a realization that strong negative public opinion about the United States could affect how helpful countries will be in the war on terrorism. Moreover, negative sentiment might assist terrorist groups in recruiting new members (Epstein, 2005, p. 2)

Along with this realization came calls for a direct, necessary, and long missing link between public diplomacy and foreign policy formation (see Nye, 2004, for a concise source on the necessity of incorporating foreign policy and public diplomacy for success in world politics).

This unprecedented focus on public diplomacy arose since public diplomacy is seen as a potential remedy for the detected negative public opinion. It was prompted by a belief that the United States should do a better job communicating directly with citizens of other countries. Among the goals of such communication efforts are: to better explain U.S. foreign policies, enlist everyone's cooperation on the U.S.-led war on terror, and improve how citizens of other

countries feel about the United States (Committee on International Relations, 2001a and 2001b; USACPD, 2002; Epstein 2005). Reflection upon the success of U.S. public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War also prompted the need for such campaigns in today's so-called "war of ideas" (see Melissen, 2005a, and Arndt, 2005, for a succinct history of the origins and evolution of public diplomacy). This sudden prioritizing of public diplomacy was tangibly observed shortly after the terrorist attacks of 2001 with the holding of Congressional hearings on the topic (see Committee on International Relations, 2001a and 2001b).

There were also calls for clearly focusing on the general populations rather than on diplomats and public opinion leaders of targeted countries:

> We have to go beyond the significant dialogue we have with government officials and country leaders and reach out to mass audiences. We are talking about millions of ordinary people, a huge number of whom have gravely distorted, but carefully cultivated images of us – images so negative – so weird, so hostile that I can assure you a young generation of terrorists is being created (Beers, 2003, pp. 2-3).

The U.S. investment in public diplomacy efforts is evident by the budget allocations designated for such tasks. In 2005, for instance, $597 million was devoted to public diplomacy and public affairs, much of which supports efforts targeting Middle Eastern audiences in particular. As of 2006, the role of public diplomacy in the U.S.-led war on terror continues to remain a priority, as funding for efforts targeting Muslim audiences in the Arab world continue to increase (GAO, 2006). Clearly, the U.S. administration considers public diplomacy to be an essential element in the U.S. war on terror.

The purpose of this chapter is to document the discussion concerning the role that public diplomacy can play in influencing Muslim public opinion of the United States. Tracing the evolution of this discussion and the issues associated with it will enable us to identify areas in need of greater development, and subsequently narrow the focus of this book to these areas and further develop them in ensuing chapters.

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL NEGATIVE PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE U.S.

In order to approach this discussion systematically, the following paragraphs will first define the term "U.S. public diplomacy." This will be followed by a review of U.S. public diplomacy deliberations, a detailing of key public diplomacy actions taken by the U.S. government since September 11, 2001, and then a conceptualization of public diplomacy as an empirical research problem.

U.S. Public Diplomacy Defined

The "Dictionary of International Relations Terms of the U.S. Department of State" officially defines the term "public diplomacy" as:

> Government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television (USIA Alumni Association, 2002).

Other definitions appearing in U.S. government publications hover around the same theme. For example, in a 2003 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, public diplomacy is defined as "…reaching out beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies" (GAO, 2003, p. 6). In a U.S. Congressional Research Service report, public diplomacy is defined as "…the promotion of America's interests, culture and policies by informing and influencing foreign populations" (Epstein, 2005, p. 1).

An early 1960s brochure of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University provided a broader definition of U.S. public diplomacy:

> Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by

> governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications (USIA Alumni Association, 2002).

Christopher Ross, who worked as U.S. ambassador to Syria and held several high-ranked positions at the U.S. Department of State, defines the tasks of U.S. public diplomacy as:

1. To "articulate U.S. policy clearly in as many media and languages as are necessary to ensure that the message is received" (Ross, 2002, p. 77). This is a short-term goal achieved by using various media, including international broadcasting.
2. To "develop an overseas understanding and appreciation of U.S. society – the people and values in the United States." This is a long term goal achieved "[f]or the most part… [through] educational and cultural exchange programs" (Ross, 2002, p. 80).

According to Potter (2003), the definition of public diplomacy has been extended from the articulation and promotion of a country's "story" to include an understanding of the "stories" of others. He also points out the extended definition of public diplomacy, given by Gifford Malone, who served as deputy assistant director of the United States Information Agency and deputy associate director for programs of USIA, as a two-way, rather than one-way, street: "If we strive to be successful in our efforts to create understanding for our society and for our policies, we must first understand the motives, culture, history, and psychology of the people with whom we wish to communicate" (Potter, 2003, ¶7). Johnson and Dale (2003) differentiate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy by clarifying that while traditional diplomacy focuses on government-to-government cooperation, public diplomacy seeks shared "understanding and cooperation between a nation and foreign publics by identifying its institutions and activities with those publics' interests" (p. 3). Specifically, it does so by relying on communication "to foster a common understanding of ideas" and ultimately encourage a sense of community (Johnson and Dale, 2003, p. 3). According to Johnson and Dale (2003), the "meat and potatoes" of public diplomacy include providing foreign journalists with timely news, giving foreign publics information on America through pamphlets

and books, sponsoring exchanges to the United States, exhibiting U.S. artwork, broadcasting American values and policies in different languages, and transmitting balanced news.

Of late, the traditional meaning of "public diplomacy" is being replaced by a more contemporary view to better fit its adaptation to the information age and the increased pressures and opportunities that communication technologies provide (Vickers, 2004, p. 182). Increasingly, this so-called "new public diplomacy" is characterized "as a blurring of traditional distinctions between international and domestic information activities, between public and traditional diplomacy and between cultural diplomacy, marketing and news management" (Vickers, 2004, p. 191). In reference to the shifting scope of public diplomacy, Bruce Gregory (2005), Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute, further describes how the term "is now part of a global conversation following several decades of use and considerable dispute on its meaning among professionals" by pointing out that many analysts now use it synonymously with the term "strategic communication" (p. 6). Despite its various narrow and broader characterizations, in order to best understand what U.S. public diplomacy stands for, it is necessary to differentiate it from what it is not, as it is often lumped together with "traditional diplomacy" and "propaganda."

> Traditional diplomacy actively engages one government with another government. In traditional diplomacy, U.S. Embassy officials represent the U.S. Government in a host country primarily by maintaining relations and conducting official USG business with the officials of the host government whereas public diplomacy primarily engages many diverse non-government elements of a society…Furthermore, public diplomacy activities often present many differing views as represented by private American individuals and organizations in addition to official U.S. Government views (USIA Alumni Association, 2002, Public Diplomacy and Traditional Diplomacy section, ¶1-2).

It is a common perception that the term "public diplomacy" is a sugarcoated term for "propaganda." Propaganda, of course, has negative connotations, as it brings to mind psychological warfare, deception and the negative images of World War II (Kendrick and Fullerton, 2004). Is U.S. public diplomacy, in reality, propaganda? If not, then how does U.S. public diplomacy differ from propaganda? The key difference in the mind of U.S. officials is whether the information is based on facts and transmitted as facts or

whether it is based on lies and/or a distortion of facts and transmitted as such. The former is public diplomacy, the latter is propaganda. This notion appeared before a Congressional Committee in 1963 in the testimony of Edward R. Murrow, who at the time served as Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA):

> American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that (USIA Alumni Association, 2002).

Christopher Ross repeated this same notion in the context of a forum held by the Brookings Institution in January of 2002. Answering a question posed by a co-panelist about the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda, Ross answered:

> Much propaganda contains lies and does not shy away from them. In public diplomacy we don't deliberately look to state things that are not true. We may couch them a certain way, but we deal with the truth ("The Propaganda War…," 2002).

Rawnsley (2005) goes into slightly more depth by pointing out that "most propaganda turns on creating a dichotomy between the self and the 'other', and leans on history (or at least interpretations of history) to strengthen the claims that 'the other' is in some way inferior and/or threatening to self-identity" (p. 1066).

In comparing public diplomacy to propaganda and nation-branding, Melissen (2005b) claims they are:

> About the communication of information and ideas to foreign publics with a view to changing their attitudes towards the originating country or reinforcing existing beliefs… Propaganda and nation-branding, however, neither point to the concept of diplomacy, nor do they generally view communication with foreign publics in the context of changes in contemporary diplomacy (p. 19).

Thus while both propaganda and public diplomacy are communication tasks that entail elements of persuasion, U.S. public diplomacy, as defined above by Edward R. Murrow and echoed by Christopher Ross, clearly differs from the notion of propaganda that brings to mind psychological warfare and deception. This book

focuses on the notion of public diplomacy that is devoid of propaganda. How has public diplomacy been envisioned by the U.S. government in the post-9/11 period?

U.S. Public Diplomacy Comes to the Forefront Post-9/11

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress began a series of hearings on the topic of U.S. public diplomacy in a quest to determine what role it can play in improving the U.S. image abroad and assisting in the global war on terror (see Committee on International Relations, 2001a and 2001b). Since that time, numerous perspectives have been expressed about U.S. public diplomacy policy and many recommendations for public diplomacy actions have been offered. The contexts in which these points of view have been expressed include Congressional hearings, journalistic writing, and academic publications. For example, Edward S. Walker, Jr., who in 2001 served as President of the Middle East Institute, and was a previous U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, and a former U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, recommends what he labels as "short-term actions":

- Coordination between Hollywood and VOA [Voice of America] to develop professional-grade programming for local broadcast outlets.
- Involving Hollywood with the film industry in Cairo and Beirut, for example: designing PSAs for broadcast on state-run TV, exchanges of technical/creative staffs.
- Greater engagement with multiple local outlets- Al Jazeera is not the only station: work with state-run media for guest bookings.
- Design supplemental materials in Arabic on American studies for elementary and secondary school students.
- Expand programs of email Pen pals, establishing networks of communication between U.S. and Middle Eastern schools.
- Tell the human interest story; remove restriction on USAID from advertising their good work; advance and publicize the good work of U.S.-based NGOs.
- Develop a resource base of prominent Americans, including Arab-Americans, who can be informal ambassadors.
- Ensure that we speak to the local audience, differentiating between countries-one size does not fit all- and stop addressing Washington when we are trying to address Riyadh (Walker, 2001, pp. 14-15).

John W. Leslie, Jr., who in 2001 served as Chairman of Weber Shandwick Worldwide, a leading global public relations and communications management firm, believes "there are six courses of action that are central to communicating the message of America":

- First, apply the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War to communications;
- Second, reorganize management of public policy;
- Third, tap into the best minds in communications;
- Fourth, don't rule out any tactic;
- Fifth, put communications 'troops' on the ground; and
- Sixth, conduct actionable research (Leslie, 2001, p. 18).

Former Advertising Council Chairman and retired Procter and Gamble Global Marketing Officer, Robert L. Wehling is "… absolutely convinced that an advertising and communications program can be effective in the Middle East, but only if a number of important guidelines are followed" (Wehling, 2001, p. 21). He states:

- First, I cannot overstate the importance of alignment and consistency. Whatever we say must be perceived as messages the entire Administration and Congress support. Once the messages are crafted and approved, they need to be delivered over and over and over.
- Second, our experience suggests that it is unlikely there is a single message that will resonate throughout the Arab world.
- Third, don't start writing messages before getting up-to-date research in each country regarding how people feel; why they feel that way, and what it would take to change their minds.
- Fourth, …there is probably no one message that's right for all the people in a country.
- Fifth, …messages which appeal to us here in the U.S. may not be the most persuasive in the Middle East.
- Sixth, …our actions must be fully consistent with our words.
- Seventh, we should employ the services of a global ad agency with a proven track record in the Middle East and be willing to work directly with their local offices in the region. Any campaign should be developed and executed by people living in the area and intensely familiar with the people, culture, and current attitudes, in each area (Wehling, 2001, p. 21).

Previous Washington Bureau Chief of the London-based *Al Hayat* newspaper and in 2001, news director of U.S.-supported Arabic television network *Al-Hurra*, Mouafac Harb's advice is to:

1. Know your audience.
2. Be mindful of the generators of resentment.
3. Establish a "resentment index" in each country.
4. Don't treat bin Laden as an equal (Harb, 2001, pp. 25-26).

Norman J. Pattiz, who served as Chairman and founder of Westwood One, Inc. and was a Broadcasting Board of Governors member in 2001, proposes to use radio as a public diplomacy tool. He details the strategy of what he calls "The Middle East Radio Network" suggesting it will:

a. …Present a consistent, uniform format that achieves a clear identity the audience can relate to and easily recognize (p. 9).
b. …Be a force in the market- on the air 24/7 on multiple channels that the audience uses (p. 9).
c. …Be heavily "local" in what [it] programs and the way [it] sounds (p. 9).
d. …Know the audience and program that audience (p. 10).
e. …Talk with people, not at them (p. 10).
f. …Be a model of democracy in action (p. 10).
g. …Be an example of a free press (p. 10).
h. …Attract an audience by creatively using entertainment and music (Pattiz, 2001, p. 10).

In its 2002 report, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (USACPD) focuses on the organizational structure and funding of U.S. public diplomacy and how to clarify and reform it. With respect to structure, the USACPD (2002) recommends the following implementations:

1. Issue a Presidential mandate: making it clear that public diplomacy is a strategic component of American foreign policy (p. 5).
2. Fully implement the White House Office of Global Communications: that links Presidential leadership with the departments and agencies that carry out public diplomacy (p. 5).
3. Review the consolidation of USIA (United States Information Agency) into the State Department.
4. Integrate Congress into public diplomacy efforts.
5. Involve the private sector: including communications consultants, the academic community, and the advertising and entertainment sectors (p. 7).

The USACPD (2002) also makes the following recommendations concerning funding:

1. Recognize that money alone will not fix the problems.
2. Assess the state of America's readiness worldwide: evaluate country-specific public diplomacy programs and staffing.
3. Examine the nation's public diplomacy investment relative to other areas (p. 9).

Dr. Daniel Brumberg, who at the time of his 2002 congressional testimony served as Associate Professor of the Department of Government at Georgetown University, conceptualizes the problem of foreign public opinion in terms of three concentric circles, each representative of what can be considered to be a cluster of individuals. At the center, the smallest circle represents committed Islamist ideologues. The next circle consists of their immediate audience composed of professionals, academics and students, and the third, the largest cluster, consists of the broad population. In order to counter negative perceptions of the United States, Brumberg (2002) recommends:

a. Address the regional conflicts that have created fertile ground for the purveyors of hate language (p. 9).
b. Address those [foreign] government and media elites who have cynically traded in the hate speech and conspiracy theorizing. (p. 9)
c. Engage the editors and producers of al-Jazeera in a critical dialogue about the nature and consequences of its reporting on international affairs (p. 10).
d. Increase society-to-society exchanges between professionals, students and journalists in the Arab world (p. 10).
e. Promote educational, economic and political reforms that help Arab reformists reshape national environments in ways that make it harder for anti-American ideologues to sell their wares (Brumberg, 2002, p. 10).

Shibley Telhami, who in 2002 was the Anwar Sadat Professor at the University Maryland, presents several recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy, paraphrased as follows:

a. Take into consideration the diversity of Muslim audiences;
b. Pick messengers that have credibility with the audience;
c. Use local media that have credibility with the audience;
d. Encourage the messengers to show empathy to the suffering of Muslim people, when applicable;
e. Increase regional humanitarian projects and highlight such projects;

f. Be aware that "conspiracy theory" is a common filter through which Muslim audiences process news messages about the U.S.;
g. Take time to explain and justify U.S. foreign policies to Muslim audiences;
h. Ensure that U.S. policymakers use care when making statements domestically about matters related to the Muslim world, as these will resonate abroad;
j. Increase people to people contacts through media and education exchanges (Telhami, 2002).

In terms of media-related public diplomacy practices, there have also been calls for research into the role local media in other countries play with regard to U.S. public diplomacy efforts abroad. Wang and Chang (2004) highlight the fact that "the aspect of the local press is not just significant in studying public diplomacy and the US media, but also relevant to US public diplomacy strategies and tactics overseas" (p. 23). Indeed, they argue:

> More research is needed to look into the transformation that has taken place in the local media in other countries as a result of the development of modern communication technologies and the globalization movement, and to investigate and theorize the role and function of the local media in public diplomacy and international public relations (Wang & Chang, 2004, p. 23).

By focusing more narrowly on issues like the proliferation of technology, the Internet and power, Nina Hachigian (2002), who is director of RAND's Center for Asia Pacific Policy and was formerly on the staff of the National Security Council, suggests the Internet may also serve as a public diplomacy tool by aiding in the political empowerment of populations and possibly threatening regimes. She argues that although U.S. efforts to promote progress toward democracy must account for various political, economic, social, and other factors, "increasing Internet access abroad is a worthwhile activity where it can contribute to pluralization, economic growth, improved education, and better healthcare" (p. 56). Although, she states "it is unlikely to trigger political change in regimes that would welcome such efforts" (p. 56). Conversely, Larson (2004) focuses, in part, on the role the Internet plays in the formulation of foreign policies, although he indicates that these effects vary depending on the foreign policy situation. He also points out, however, that the Internet possesses a "permanence or staying power" that is uncharacteristic of television (p. 8).

With specific attention to the role information and media play in "creating and feeding" modern international conflicts, Broadcasting Board of Governors member Edward Kaufman, who is also a senior lecturing fellow at Duke University's School of Law and Fuqua School of Business, called for a broadcasting strategy to win today's media war. Specifically, he makes the following argument:

> Effective broadcasting to "win hearts and minds" strengthens the traditional triad of diplomacy, economic leverage, and military power and is the fourth dimension of foreign conflict resolution. Particularly in times of crisis, the United States must deliver clear, effective programming to foreign populations via the media (Kaufman, 2002, p. 115).

In light of what he describes as television and newspaper media commentary during 9/11 around the Muslim world that insinuated "…the United States was arrogant, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel…" (p.120), Kaufman (2002) asserts: "International broadcasting must return to the front page of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Media is a big part of the problem and, therefore, the president must have a strong and prominent media solution" (p. 125).

In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on improving U.S. public diplomacy. In it the GAO addresses "the planning, coordination, execution and assessment of U.S. public diplomacy efforts" (p. 21). The GAO recommended that the U.S. Secretary of State:

- develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of the State's public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives;
- consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research;
- designate more administrative positions to overseas public affair sections to reduce the administrative burden;
- strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and
- program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State's assignment process (GAO, 2003, p. 21).

Christopher Ross put forth what he calls the "seven pillars of public diplomacy" (Ross, 2003, p. 22):

1. The U.S. must "ensure that foreign audiences understand U.S. policies for what they are, not what others say they are" (p. 22).
2. The U.S. must "provide reasons and rationale – the context – for its policies" (p. 23).
3. "U.S. international messages must be consistent, truthful and credible" (p. 24).
4. The messages need to be tailored "for specific audiences" (p. 24).
5. "We must leverage our messages through all the communications channels at our command: Internet-based media (email publishing and websites), broadcasting (radio and television), print publications and press placements, traveling speakers, and educational and cultural exchanges" (p. 26).
6. "We cannot reach these new audiences by ourselves. We need the strength of international alliances and private-sector partners, whether global corporations, humanitarian organizations, or U.S. expatriate communities abroad" (p. 26).
7. "We must listen to the world as well as speak to it. The failure to listen and to provide more avenues for dialogue will only strengthen the stereotype of the United States as arrogant, when, in fact, we are often being inattentive" (p. 27).

Van Ham (2003) indicates that the United States might be sending out too many diverse messages to Muslim publics and, in order to be most effective, the country should re-focus its communication efforts. He points out:

> One of the more significant practical problems remains how to harmonize foreign policy and diplomacy with a coherent national branding strategy. Public diplomacy is also based on a "to know us is to love us" attitude that barely hides the prevalent arrogance of many Americans about their allegedly superior "way of life" (p. 441).

The so-called Djerejian Report, titled "Changing Minds, Winning Peace" and issued in October 2003 by the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, offered a critique of Washington's efforts and failures in delivering its message to Muslims around the world since 9/11 and provides the following key suggestions:

- Demonstrate presidential commitment to a new "strategic direction" for public diplomacy, which would not only recognize the importance that public diplomacy plays in U.S. national security, but also reinforce that recognition with resources, personnel, and ongoing presidential interest.
- Initiate a thorough overhaul of the bureaucratic design of U.S. public diplomacy, including the creation of a presidential "counselor," the

invigoration of the National Security Council/Principles Coordinating Committee on public diplomacy, the formation of a Public Diplomacy Experts Board, the establishment of a government-chartered Corporation of Public Diplomacy, and the funding of a Center for U.S.-Arab/Muslim Studies and Dialogue.

- Budget significant new funding for a broad array of public diplomacy initiatives, including additional personnel and training; academic and professional exchanges; improved and expanded use of information technology; and investment in English-language training, new "American Knowledge Libraries," and book translation and American studies opportunities at foreign universities throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds (Satloff, 2004, pp. 55-56).

Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, director of the Aspen Institute Berlin, and Craig Kennedy, president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, recommends the U.S. adopt four strategies for revitalizing public diplomacy:

- First, senior officials must accept that public diplomacy is an integral part of U.S. foreign policy (p. 73).
- Second, senior administration officials need to travel and be willing to engage in serious debate with America's critics abroad (p. 73).
- Third, adequate financial resources must be made available [for public diplomacy] (p. 74).
- Finally, the United States needs a renewed debate on what form effective public diplomacy should take (Gedmin and Kennedy, 2004, p. 74).

The RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization, focused on the issue of U.S. public diplomacy in a report released in 2004. The authors of the report conclude and recommend the following:

- The task of public diplomacy and the obstacles confronting them are so challenging that the enterprise should seek to enlist creative talent and solicit new ideas from the private sector, through outsourcing of major elements of the public diplomacy mission.
- It would be worthwhile to consider differing modes of communicating the "big ideas" of public diplomacy through debate and discussion rather than through the typical monologist conveyance of the message.
- Current efforts to bring honest, unbiased information to people in the Middle East [i.e. Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra] may provide platforms for implementing the foregoing ideas (Wolf and Rosen, 2004, p. 23).

In 2004, Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9-11 Commission, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. In his testimony, he relayed the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission with respect to public diplomacy. Hamilton (2004) notes that the United States' message targeting Muslim and Arab populations should be along seven themes:

1. Political reform
2. Economic reform
3. Educational opportunity
4. Economic opportunity
5. Rule of law
6. Mutual respect
7. Tolerance

The USIA Alumni Association report on U.S. public diplomacy (Coffey, Silverman, Maurer, and Rugh, 2004) highlights more practical, organizational challenges facing public diplomacy and offers recommendations for how to address such issues:

- Communication with country audiences, both field-driven and Washington-driven, must be supported by a Washington process that is clearly defined and responsive (¶2).
- A new geographic staff would possess country expertise and advise on and support to all programming – what will work, cultural barriers, etc. (¶4).
- Listening and learning (in the local language) followed by convincing discussion with opinion leaders are essential. The climate of public opinion can only be influenced if the [public diplomacy] conveyors in the field have achieved credibility in their dealings with opinion leaders (¶7).
- Geographic and country expertise must be instantly available to advise PD leadership which initiatives will work and won't work and to make program recommendations. Resources and budget re-allocations must become more flexible and faster in application (¶8).
- Funding and outreach of [public diplomacy] field programs severely limit effectiveness of our [public diplomacy] efforts around the world, especially in the crucial geographic areas spotlighted in the aftermath of 9/11. Shortage of resources to re-open libraries (American rooms), branch posts, pursue other outreach programs and to restore appropriate country levels of [public diplomacy] personnel within our embassies are crippling (¶9).

- At the center of this problem is the way the [public diplomacy] problem is organized within State…To make a difference, [public diplomacy] must be accepted as a valuable foreign policy instrument and effect important changes to its operation in the Department as recommended (¶10; ¶23).

Riordan (2004) contends that public diplomacy efforts formulated to reflect spin, brand, and marketing-oriented strategies do not fare well in the eyes of many who fear such efforts come with damaging risks:

> The idea that public diplomacy is about selling policy and values, and national image, remains central to much theoretical and practical work on the issue…but the examples we have looked at of engagement with Islam and national building suggest this may be a seriously mistaken approach (Riordan, 2004, p. 9).

Similarly, in a RAND initiated research report titled *Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve it*, Wolf and Rosen (2004) urge, "It is fanciful to believe that redeploying American 'marketing talent,' even when supplemented by the $62 million appropriated to launch a new Middle East television network, would significantly diminish the prevalence of anti-Americanism" (p. 5). Instead, they suggest that U.S. public diplomacy emphasize "the long history of U.S. support for *Muslim* Bosnians, Kosovars, and Albanians in forcefully combating the brutal 'ethnic cleansing' in the Balkans in the 1990s… [as well as] the perennial American support for Muslim Turkey's admission to the European Union" (p. 7-8). Moreover, Wolf and Rosen (2004) claim that communicating the rationale motivating American policies is just as important as it is to communicate past U.S. support and defense of Muslim populations:

> The overarching message public diplomacy should convey is that the United States tries, although it does not always succeed, to further [the values of democracy, tolerance, the rule of law, and pluralism as witnessed historically] regardless of the religion, ethnicity, or other characteristics of the individuals and groups involved (p. 8).

The recommendations made in 2004 by the USIA Alumni Association, and noted earlier in this chapter, are echoed in an August 2005 report published by the Heritage Foundation. This report finds that, amid continued negative views of the United

States, "the communications machinery at the Department of State remains in disarray, interagency coordination remains minimal, and America's foreign communications effort lack focus" (Johnson, Dale, & Cronin, 2005, ¶1). Additional recommendations quoted from this report included the need to:

- Strengthen State Department public diplomacy with personnel and budgetary authority…
- Streamline foreign broadcasting…
- Integrate efforts across government agencies…
- [Promote] regional and local media initiatives that combat extremism…
- [Invest] in education…
- [Engage] opinion leaders (¶10-15).

Within the realm of cultural diplomacy, the Center for Arts and Culture (2004) builds upon survey research indicating that American culture is simultaneously accepted and resisted by foreign countries and suggests the following public diplomacy actions:

(1) U.S. programs should recognize the value of other cultures, show a desire to learn from them, and seek ways to help preserve their traditions and historic sites and artifacts.
(2) Programs should continue to reflect that improved intercultural understanding must be a two-way street. Opportunities to learn from shared cultural exchanges and expression should include both bringing American culture to countries abroad and the reciprocal bringing of the culture of other countries to the United States.
(3) Programs and events should both introduce aspects of American life, culture and history, and reflect the needs and character of the specific place.
(4) Cultural diplomacy should involve the selective use of popular culture (p. 9).

Among numerous recommendations, the Center encourages the integration of public and cultural diplomacy into all levels of training of the foreign affairs community and the establishment of systems to track and engage former exchange program participants and measure the impact of public and cultural diplomacy efforts.

In 2005, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) again addresses the issue of public diplomacy. Its recommendations focus on how to better coordinate these efforts:

> …We recommend the Director of the Office of Global Communications fully implement the role defined for it by the President's executive order, including facilitating the development of a communications strategy, assessing the methods and strategies used by the U.S. government to communicate with overseas audiences, and coordinating the delivery of messages that reflect the strategic communications framework and priorities of the United States. To help ensure that private sector resources, talents, and ideas are effectively leveraged and utilized, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives (GAO, 2005, p. 28).

Amid the strategically focused and so-called "Madison Avenue" public diplomacy recommendations made by some experts comes a heeding call for cultural diplomacy "which presents the best of what American artists, performers, and thinkers have to offer," (Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, 2005, p. 3; Schneider, 2004). Described as the linchpin of public diplomacy in a 2005 report to the U.S. Department of State, the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (2005) lists the following considerations for the Secretary of State:

- Increase funding and staffing for cultural diplomacy and, in a larger sense, for public diplomacy.
- Provide advanced training and professional development opportunities for FSOs, who are public affairs officers and have responsibility for public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy throughout their careers, with particular attention to research, polling, and the uses of new media.
- Create an independent clearinghouse, in the manner of the British Council, to promote the national interest; support missions in their efforts to bring the best artists, writers, and other cultural figures to their audiences; develop public-private partnerships; and raise funds, with separate housing from the embassies so that cultural events can attract wider audiences.
- Set aside funds for translation projects, into and out of English, of the most important literary, intellectual, philosophical, political, and spiritual works from this and other countries.
- Streamline visa issues, particularly for international students.
- …Revamp Al Hurra, the Arabic language television station, in keeping with the highest traditions of American broadcasting.
- Expand international cultural exchange programs, inviting more Arab and Muslim artists, performers, and writers to the United States, and sending their American counterparts to the Islamic world (p. 2).

Also in 2005, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs, established a strategic approach for U.S. public diplomacy efforts. It prioritizes three objectives to: "(1) support the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; (2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding regarding shared values and common interests between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths" (p. 27). Tactics deemed valuable in achieving these goals include engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and evaluation, in addition to public diplomacy programs. As of 2006, however, a written guide for this strategic framework had yet to be developed (GAO, 2006).

In a 2006 GAO public diplomacy report, the U.S. Department of State reiterates previous concerns and recommendations for enhancing U.S. efforts in the Middle East. Upon reviewing prior and current initiatives, the 2006 GAO report reveals that U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Arab world lack "important strategic communication elements found in the private sector" (p. 4). Their recommendations include the:

(a) Adoption of "a strategic approach to public diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication practices to suit its purposes" (See Figure 1.1).
(b) Development of a core message/theme that is based internationally, regionally, or country-by-country; and to better clarify and define its message to avoid sending out too many competing messages.
(c) Analysis and segmentation of target markets to allow for the creation of effective information campaigns.
(d) Use of more detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide "the implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and tools" (p. 23). These strategies include "message amplification tactics or the use of third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of delivered messages" (p. 23).
(e) Research of "(1) audiences attitudes and beliefs, (2) root causes driving negative sentiments and beliefs, (3) country-specific social, economic, political, and military environments, (4) local media and communication options, and (5) diagnosis of deeper performance issues and possible program fixes" (pp. 24-25).
(f) Development of a detailed, country-specific communication plan "to pull together the complex data and analysis required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored and improved as needed based on performance feedback" (p. 26).

Figure 1.1

Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy



Source: GAO, 2006

Moreover, there is concern that despite current efforts, the U.S. may still be sending out unintentional messages to Muslim audiences in the Arab World. A 2006 GAO report suggests that security and budgetary concerns may be hindering public outreach efforts and sending Arab and Muslim audiences "the unintended message that the U.S. is unapproachable" (p. 4). The GAO (2006) report reiterates Van Ham's (2003) assessment that the United States might be sending out too many diverse messages to Muslim publics and, in order to be most effective, the country should re-focus its communication efforts.

It is worth noting that the recommendations above are profuse, the opinions of the various entities that generated them vary, and

their many advices cover a wide array of areas related to public diplomacy. With that in mind, what public diplomacy actions has the U.S. government implemented since September 11, 2001?

U.S. Public Diplomacy Actions Since September 11, 2001

The focus of this section is confined to U.S. public diplomacy actions targeting Arabs and Muslims. The activities undertaken since 9/11 are too numerous to itemize. However, they can be categorized under four headings: Information programs, Exchanges, International Broadcasting, and Development. A sample of these activities is provided below:

A. Information Programs

The U.S. "tripled the publishing of text in Arabic, developed an Arabic-language magazine and started a Persian language website… increased to 140 the number of overseas multi-media centers called American Corners – rooms in office buildings or on campuses where students, teachers, and the general public can learn America's story through the use of books, computers, magazines and video" (Epstein, 2005, p. 8). *Hi* magazine and its accompanying Web site, for example, were launched in 2002 with the purpose of highlighting American culture, values, and lifestyles for Arab youth. Although publication of *Hi* magazine was suspended in late 2005, the Web site remains in operation as of 2006 (GAO, 2006).

B. Exchanges

The U.S. increased the frequency of exchanges. For example, in 2002, "49 Arab women who are political activists or leaders from 15 different countries" were brought to the U.S. where they met "political candidates, lobbyists, strategists, journalists and voters and followed the American election process and election night" (Epstein, 2005, p. 8). Another example involves a program called Partnership for Learning, also launched in 2002, "to reach youth in Arab and Muslim countries" (Epstein, p. 8). Among its objectives, the program provides for Arab and Muslim students to experience American life as exchange students at U.S. high schools while living with American families. Although the Partnerships for

Learning exchange program was cancelled in late 2005, a number of exchange programs continue to target marginalized Muslim youths throughout the Arab world (GAO, 2006).

In 2006, active exchange programs launched by the U.S. Department of State include Youth Exchange and Study (YES) and Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Studies (PLUS) program. Between 2003 and 2005, YES designated over 600 scholarships to high school students from the Islamic world to study in the U.S. Since 2004, PLUS brought over 170 students from the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa to study in the U.S. for two years. As of 2006, YES and PLUS operate through a combined budget of $25 million (GAO, 2006).

C. International Broadcasting

Sharp (2005) indicates that as early as March of 2002,

> The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) launched Radio Sawa, an Arabic language radio station that combines western and Arab popular music with news broadcasts and specialized programming. The State Department also implemented the 'Shared Values' Program, a $15 million television advertising campaign that promoted positive images of Muslim life in America (Sharp, 2005, p. 2).

In February of 2004, the BBG launched Al-Hurra, [an Arabic] television network modeled after "a typical American commercial network but with more time devoted to news programming" (Sharp, 2005, p. 3). Although the TV campaign and "Open Dialogue" Web site behind the Shared Values initiative were discontinued, the United States continues to promote American broadcasting efforts in the Muslim world. In fact, as of 2006, administration plans are in place to increase U.S. broadcasting in the Arab world. The 2007 budget request includes "a request to increase U.S. broadcasting to countries in the Muslim world while reducing broadcasts elsewhere, particularly in Europe and Eurasia" (GAO, 2006, p. 34).

As of 2006, additional U.S. media efforts in the region include:

(a) "A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and give the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to U.S. cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs officers, regional combatant commands, and others" (pp. 16-17).

(b) " 'Echo Chamber' messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others with clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major news stories and policy issues. These policy-level statements are posted to State's internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post staff around the world…" (p. 17).

(c) "Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial office space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to three spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional media outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to advocate U.S. policies…" (p. 17).

Furthermore, U.S. public diplomacy efforts were underway in 2006 with the purposes of empowering American Muslims to speak for the United States, creating an Office of Public/Private Partnerships to increase involvement of the private sector, and developing "enhanced technology to expand the use of new communication venues in order to better reach target audiences" (GAO, 2006, p. 17).

Although a number of U.S. media efforts have been established with the primary goal of influencing Arab and Muslim audiences in the Middle East, underlying criticism suggests these mass mediated messages may be received with confusion. The Foreign Policy Centre (2003) highlights the fact that "dislike of real policies in the Middle East is mixed with conspiracy theories" (¶10). Also of concern is the reality that "statements made by public figures in the West are confused with official government policy," as was the case when "the description of Saudi Arabia as the 'kernel of evil' by a member of the RAND think-tank in Washington was interpreted as an insight into the Bush administration's view" (The Foreign Policy Centre, 2003, ¶10).

D. Development

"In December 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the formation of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to fund civil society projects that foster political, economic, and educational development in the Arab world" (Sharp, 2005, p. 2). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been funding development projects in the Arab and Muslim world for numerous years. In 2003, it began "a process of changing its marking policy to ensure that all USAID programs, projects and activities are clearly identified as funded by the American people" (USACPD, 2004, p. 23).

Although various efforts and initiatives have been imparted since 9/11 for the sake of U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, there is evidence (and criticism) that the current process of public diplomacy decision making is not based on empirical data but instead subsists from the opinions, suggestions, and assumptions of professional, government and non-governmental entities and so-called "experts" in the Arab, Islamic, marketing, and socio-political fields, among others (see Snow, 2003, for an account of how current U.S. public diplomacy decision-making efforts are currently being conducted).

In response to concerns that Washington's urgency to implement public diplomacy in the war on terror may be impeding actual efforts in the region, Satloff (2004) also stresses that urgency must be balanced with realism:

> Rushing to enhance public diplomacy efforts without a clear understanding of objectives, constraints, sequence, and the different means at the government's disposal risks not only a dispersal of effort and wasted resources but, in the worst case, actually ceding important ground in the "hearts-and-minds" campaign. In devising public diplomacy toward the Middle East, the key to success will be to marry the principles of "making haste, slowly" and "do no harm" (p. 3).

The Public Diplomacy Challenge as an Academic Research Question

From an academic point of view, the problem at hand can be conceptualized using a communication research paradigm. In order to visualize how the communication research paradigm is relevant to the problem at hand, Figure 1.2 depicts the following components that are borrowed from the Shannon and Weaver communication process model (as depicted in Hiebert, Ungurait & Bohn, 1988):

The sender (here the United States Government);

The message (what the United States Government ought to communicate);

The receivers (the audience members targeted by the message, here the individual members of the world's Muslim populations); and

Noise (those aspects that prevent the receiver from interpreting the message in the manner the sender intended it).

Figure 1.2

Basic Components of a Communication Process Model



Source: Adapted from the Shannon and Weaver communication process model as depicted in Hiebert, Ungurait and Bohn (1988).

Note that the term "communication" is not used here to solely denote the output of international broadcasting or only the outcome of interpersonal contact through cultural exchanges. Rather, communication subsumes attempts at transmitting explicit messages that are carefully prepared by the source and transmitting implicit messages that are incidental to other activities of the source. An example of an explicit attempt is the Voice of America broadcasting an explanation of U.S. foreign policy to an Arabic speaking audience. An example of an implicit message incidentally transmitted is USAID building a civilian bridge to facilitate automobile traffic in Egypt. Through such action, the implicit message sent through USAID is: "We care about Egyptians." Note that the simple transmission of explicit and implicit messages does not ensure that they will be received and interpreted by their target audience in the manner that the sender intended. Thus, for the purposes of this book, communication is a process that, aside from entailing a sender, a message, and a receiver, has the specific objective of ensuring that the receiver interprets the message in the manner in which the sender intended it. Anything short of that signifies that the communication process has failed and no communication has taken place.

Note that all of the recommendations about public diplomacy listed in an earlier section of this chapter substantively pertain to one of the aforementioned communication components, as exemplified below:

a. Examples of Recommendations Related to the Sender: Create bridges between Hollywood and the film industries in Cairo and Beirut (Walker, 2001); reorganize management of public policy (Leslie, 2001, p. 18). Issue a Presidential mandate: making clear that public diplomacy is a strategic component of American foreign policy (USACPD, 2002, p. 5). Pick messengers that have credibility with the audience (Telhami, 2002).
b. Examples of Recommendations Related to the Message: Examples include: "Tell the human interest story" (Walker, 2001, p. 14). Ensure message consistency (Wehling, 2001). Take time to explain and justify U.S. foreign policies to Muslim audiences (Telhami, 2002).
c. Examples of Recommendations Related to the Receivers and Noise: "Differentiate between countries as one size does not fit all" (Walker, 2001, p. 15). "Conduct actionable research" (Leslie, 2001, p. 18). Tailor messages to fit the audience (Wehling, 2001). "Know your audience" (Harb, 2001, p. 26).

The above are a few of the numerous recommendations that could be thematically assigned to one of the four communication process components. The substantive focus of all these recommendations concerning U.S. public diplomacy is to ensure support for the U.S.-led war on terror among Muslims living outside the U.S. Adding this notion to the communication process illustration, we find that the desirable outcome of explicit and implicit messages sent by the U.S. to Muslim audiences is a positive public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror (see Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3

Process Implicit in the Recommendations Concerning U.S. Public Diplomacy



Figure 1.3 illustrates the thoughts of those who have generated the recommendations concerning what the United States ought to do in order to increase the support for the U.S.-led war on terror among Muslim populations living abroad. Note that the links between the components illustrated in Figure 1.3 are currently dotted lines and not solid relationships. This denotes the fact that, while the recommendations about U.S. public diplomacy are profuse, the conceptual components are currently not empirically linked. In other words, there is no objective evidence that enacting a particular recommendation will indeed influence the desired outcome.

The current overarching objective of the U.S. is to increase the Muslim populations' level of support for the U.S.-led war on terror. However, there is lack of empirical evidence about how to achieve such a goal. In addition, when recommending that the audience needs to be taken into consideration, given that audience characteristics are potentially profuse, what specific aspects of a particular Muslim population does the sender need to prioritize and take into account when designing the message intended for that audience?

From a research point of view, this problem is best tackled by focusing on the intended outcome: support for the U.S.-led war on terror. In order to systematically understand the conditions that are likely to result in this outcome, we ask the following general research question:

RQ: What are the factors that influence the opinions of Muslim populations about the U.S.-led war on terror?

Answering this research question offers many benefits. It would…

a. Broaden the approach of the problem since its implications would not be confined to public diplomacy but would instead be used at any level of decision-making, including foreign policy;
b. Reduce the uncertainty involved in decision-making by presenting objective information concerning the problem;
c. Enable the focusing of funding and concentration of efforts on the most influential factors;
d. Enable the determination and refinement of the explicit and implicit messages stemming from the United States;
e. Reduce the time it would take to achieve the desired outcome;
f. Enable researchers to begin a systematic program centered on a clearly stated problem;

g. Enable the accumulation and integration of systematic research knowledge about the same problem over time; and
h. Enable the building of meaningful theories that would explain and predict aspects of this problem and advance knowledge in this area.

The following chapters focus on the research question noted above, first by reviewing the available knowledge related to the problem that the research question embodies, then by developing a theoretical model with which this problem can be studied. The theoretical model developed to address this research question is then empirically tested in several countries with substantial Muslim populations and data-supported answers to this research question are extracted as a result of this testing.

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CHAPTER

2

A Review and Integration of the Research on International Public Opinion Formation and Variation: Proposing a Conceptual Model of Muslim Public Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror

The present chapter integrates the available bodies of research knowledge about international public opinion and related areas in order to provide a theoretical grounding for the empirical study of "international Muslim public opinion about the U.S.-led war on terror." Prior to focusing specifically on this topic and further developing it, it is important to narrow the meanings of the term "international public opinion" and provide a context in which to analyze this topic.

WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

For the purposes of this book, the term "public" refers to a group of people identifiable by some demographic characteristic such as country of nationality, geographical location, age, religion, etc. The term "opinion" has been defined in many ways over the years (see Oskamp, 1977). Zaller (1992) likens every opinion to a "marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some

conclusion about it" (p. 6). In the context of the current investigation, an "opinion" is considered an overt expression by an individual of some internal state such as his/her preference, liking, agreement, etc. The term "public opinion" then refers to the overt expressions of a large group of individuals (Childs, 1965; Oskamp, 1977) pertaining to some aspect of their internal states. The importance of this definition is that it reveals the notion that the individual is a basic component of the term "public opinion." Normally, it is the opinion of each individual member of a specified public, cumulated across all individuals within that public, which results in the public opinion trends that are reported (see Childs, 1965; Oskamp, 1977).

Within the context of international Muslim public opinion toward the United States, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, the Gallup organization, and the Zogby organization report the most current public opinion results (see Stone, 2002; Pew Center for the People and the Press, 2002; Zogby, 2002; Telhami, 2003). These quantitative analyses, however, are limited to describing trends in foreign public opinion toward the U.S. They do not empirically explain the variation that exists within the described opinion trends. From a public diplomacy perspective, knowing what influences the variation of these opinions will reveal what it will take to change them in a desirable direction. In this case, understanding why international Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror varies is vital to improve this international public opinion. While describing the trend in public opinion falls solely within the domain of statistics, empirically explaining the variation of public opinion trends involves the use of statistical analytic approaches for testing theoretical explanations.

THE NEED FOR THEORY AND ITS ROLE IN UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

A theory in the context of this book is a statement or statements, derived from empirical work, whose function it is to explain and predict interrelationships among specific variables. The variable at the center of focus here (i.e., the dependent variable) is "Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror." Within this context, a valuable theory would explain why international public

opinion varies and predict the conditions that will make it vary one way or another in the future. This type of theory, if found, would be crucial to highlight and detail. If such a theory does not currently exist, then the present book should strive to develop it.

The importance of theory has long been stressed for assisting in the solution of problems similar to the one at hand. Singer (1960) states "[one] of the most promising developments in the intellectual growth of a discipline is the appearance of theory on the part of its students and practitioners. It might even be argued that, in the absence of such a concern, we have no discipline at all but merely a crudely delimited area of inquiry" (p. 431). Fogelmann (quoted by McClelland, 1960) contends that theoretical frameworks play a key role in explaining the variation inherent in public opinion data:

a. they give coherence and significance to the data and findings; they facilitate a true accumulation of knowledge;
b. they indicate areas for further research;
c. they help alert the researcher to all relevant aspects of his work;
d. they may aid in prediction (McClelland, 1960, pp. 303-304).

Kelman (1971) stresses that without a theoretical framework the researcher is unable to fully understand the implications of the data trends that he/she is observing and thus cannot make meaningful inferences from such trends:

> To make such inferences, the student of public opinion needs a theoretical framework which accounts for the adoption and expression of particular opinions on the part of individuals and groups. Such a framework can serve as a guide in the collection of data; it can provide a systematic basis for deciding what information is relevant and what questions should be asked in order to permit the drawing of inferences. Similarly, it can serve as a guide for interpreting the data and deriving implications from them (p. 401).

After reviewing numerous articles, books, and manuscripts, I came to a conclusion similar to the one identified by Inis (1960) in the context of international relations:

> …[T]hat progress toward the scholarly understanding and practical solution of th[is] problem [….] requires the development of a respectable body of theory; that a considerable quantity of theoretical bits and snatches and hopeful assortments of theoretical beginnings are already in existence; and that the time is ripe for careful assessment of those theoretical fragments and the effort to construct - from them and from

such new materials as may be required – a more systematic and elaborate body of theory" (p. 263).

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to integrate the various "theoretical beginnings that are already in existence" (Inis, 1960, p. 263) and propose a theoretical model that potentially explains the variation in Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror.

What is the general paradigm in which a theoretical model about international public opinion can exist? An individual's internal states overtly expressed in the context of public opinion consist of this individual's thoughts and feelings. Thoughts and feelings reflect an individual's perceptions of certain aspects of his/her existence and surroundings. In this regard, Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror is an overt expression of Muslims' perceptions of the U.S.-led war on terror.

Thus, a natural framework for an international public opinion theoretical model is the social-psychological paradigm originally known as social perception (see Krech & Cruchfield, 1971) and currently identified as social cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Srull & Wyer, 1988; Wyer & Srull, 1994; Sedikides, Schopler & Insko, 1998). It is certainly not within the scope of this book to fully detail the social cognition paradigm with all of its branches and specialties. Rather, it is presented here in its most simple form and, in an overview fashion, as a backdrop for contextualizing this chapter's approach to the study of international public opinion.

SOCIAL COGNITION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

A human being interfaces with the social world that surrounds him/her through his/her senses. This interfacing process generates sensory information that enables the human being to perceive the social world (Goss, 1989). Given that international public opinion, in the context of this book, consists of the overt expressions reflecting human perceptions of human behavioral outcomes (foreign policy, war, etc.) that take place within human society, the discussion of perception will be solely confined to the notion of "social perception." It is worth noting that, until the mid-1970s, the literature concerning the notion of social perception spanned several

fields of inquiry including international public opinion. Beginning in the 1970s, a new field was created for specifically and solely studying social perception under the label of social cognition. The reader should keep this historical progression in mind when following the organization of the sections below. Many important studies within the field of social perception were conducted prior to the mid-1970s and focused specifically on international public opinion (e.g., Scott, 1965). Thus, the discussion below first incorporates the findings of studies conducted prior to the mid-1970s, before exclusively relying on the more contemporary body of literature on social cognition. The reader should also keep in mind that terms used in the studies conducted pre- and post-1970s might appear different when, in reality, they refer to quasi-identical concepts. For example, "social perception" was popular in studies conducted prior to the mid-1970s, while "social cognition" is used in more contemporary investigations. Also, "image" was a popular term in studies conducted prior to the mid-1970s while "schema" is used in more modern articles. These terms and others, and the interrelationships among them, will be further described below.

Krech and Cruchfield (1971) distinguish between two areas of social perception: structural and functional. "By structural factors are meant those factors deriving solely from the nature of the physical stimuli and the neural effects they evoke in the nervous system of the individual" (p. 235). Structural perception, therefore, involves the physiological translation of sensory pickup into mental cognitions. "The functional factors of perceptual organization…are those which derive primarily from the needs, moods, past experience and memory of the individual" (Krech & Cruchfield, 1971, pp. 236-237). Functional perception, therefore, focuses on the selection of sensory pickup from among the enormous amounts of sensory cues available to the human being at any given moment during which he/she is awake and the organization of such sensory cues. This sensory selection and organization process is influenced by a combination of factors, including independent direct observation made in the past, and/or such internal thought processes as induction, deduction, or analogy (see Beike & Sherman, 1994). Functional perception is also affected by preexisting information in an individual's memory as communicated by the various agents of socialization present in a given culture: "What is selected out for perception not only is a function of our perceiving apparatus as physiologically defined but is partly a function of our perceiving

apparatus as colored and shaped by our culture" (Krech & Cruchfield, 1971, p. 248). Using Krech and Cruchfield's terminology, the focus in this chapter is on the functional aspects of social perception and how these aspects can help us understand the factors that result in the expression of such perceptions in the form of an opinion.

Perception, Beliefs, Attitudes, Images, and Schemas

Regardless of what drives the selection of sensory stimuli, once a new social stimulus is selected, the incoming sensory information is related by an individual's perception apparatus to preexisting information held by that individual (Krech & Cruchfield, 1971; Wyer & Carlston, 1994) Preexisting information is that which was acquired through previous instances of social perception (see Isaacs, 1958; Wyer & Carlston, 1994). As a result of new instances of social perception, the preexisting information held by the individual might become reinforced, expanded, or sometimes even changed (Deutsch & Merritt, 1965). Zaller (1992) contends that these preexisting conditions or predispositions are "critical in understanding the variation in individual opinion" (pp. 22-23).

Researchers have used the terms "beliefs" and "attitudes" to label two distinct yet related types of social information: preexisting and new (see Scott, 1965; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). For the purposes of this chapter, beliefs represent subjective information held by an individual as they pertain to a specific aspect of his/her social existence (e.g., the islands of the Bahamas have many sandy beaches). Attitudes are an individual's affect toward that aspect of his/her social existence (e.g., I like the islands of the Bahamas). Attitudes can be thought of as feelings held by human beings toward aspects of the social world that surround them. Although there are a plethora of definitions for the term "attitude" (see DeFleur & Westie, 1963; Oskamp, 1977; Albarracin, Johnson, Zanna, & Kumkale, 2005), this chapter conforms with those that "refer to affective or emotional components" (Klineberg, 1964, p. 48; see also Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).

Beliefs and attitudes toward a particular aspect of the social world that surrounds a human being are often interrelated (Scott, 1965). There could be a plethora of beliefs and attitudes associated with a

particular aspect of the social world. Researchers have traditionally used the term "image" (Isaacs, 1958; Deutsch & Merritt, 1965; Scott, 1965, LeVine, 1965; Kelman, 1965) to label the entire set of beliefs and attitudes associated with a particular aspect of the social world as perceived by the cognitive system of a human being. Therefore, beliefs and attitudes are components of images. Kelman (1965) defines an image as "the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system" (p. 24). According to Isaacs (1958):

> Images carried about by some people for a whole lifetime may have been fixed by a single exposure dating, perhaps, from an experience deep in the past. Or else they may emerge from a whole collection of pictures that a man takes with his mind over the years and which come out looking much the same because his mind's setting is fixed, like a fixed-focus box camera (p. 390).

Figure 2.1 depicts a very preliminary and simplistic process of social perception.

Figure 2.1

Image as an Output of Social Interaction



In Figure 2.1, and all subsequent depictions of process models in this book, we adopt the following conventions: the process of influence begins in time on the left side of the page and ends on the right; the building blocks of a process model are concepts each of which is visually housed in a rectangle; the arrows connecting the rectangles indicate presumed directional causality among the concepts.

Scott (1965) relates image to beliefs and attitudes within the context of perceiving other countries:

> …[A]n image of a nation (or any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation. In abstract terms, one may describe an image as consisting of

> three analytically distinct aspects: First and primary is the set of cognitive attributes by which the person understands the object in an intellectual way. This is his view of its inherent characteristics, which he regards as independent of his own response to them. Second, the image may contain an affective component, representing a liking or disliking for the focal object. This is usually associated with perceived attributes that the person either approves of disapproves of. Finally, the image may carry an action component, consisting of a set of responses to the object that the person deems appropriate in light of its perceived attributes (p. 72).

When exposed to a multitude of complex social stimuli, human beings tend to readily select those that can be easily related to preexisting systems of beliefs and attitudes. This tendency to relate incoming information to preexisting information was expressed in the 1960s by Klineberg (1964):

1. "We perceive according to our training, our previous experience" (p. 90).
2. "We perceive according to our mental set, our expectations" (p. 91).
3. "We perceive what we want to" (p. 91).

These previously acquired images "may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received" (Holsti, 1962, p. 245). Therefore, images are not only the outcomes of perception but they are also filters for subsequent related sensory cues thus affecting what a human being will subsequently perceive. "Images serve as screens for the selective reception of new messages, and they often control the perception and interpretation of those messages that are not completely ignored, rejected or repressed" (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965, p. 134).

Why is this the case? Putting it simply: efficiency. The field of social cognition provides a much more detailed and eloquent explanation of this process. Born in the 1970s, social cognition, as a subfield of social psychology, extends and refines much of the work on perceptual images done up until that time. It "is the study of the interaction between internal knowledge structures – our mental representations of social objects and events – and new information" about these social objects and events (Brewer, 1988, p. 1). Social cognition specifically addresses how efficiency is a goal of cognitive processing. The "cognitive miser" model of social cognition embodies "[t]he idea… that people are limited in their capacity to process information, so they take shortcuts whenever

they can" (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, p. 12). Similarly, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) assert that "under conditions of uncertainty, people are assumed to behave as cognitive misers by using old, generic knowledge to interpret new, specific knowledge" (p. 81). When faced with a plethora of complicated stimuli or a complex problem, individuals will do their best to simplify the incoming information:

> …They often attend to [these social stimuli] selectively, focusing on some features while disregarding others. They interpret these features in terms of previously acquired concepts and knowledge. Moreover, they often infer characteristics of the stimulus that were not actually mentioned in the information, and construe relations among these characteristics that were not specified (Wyer and Carlston, 1994, p. 42).

Social cognition researchers have given a label to the preexisting knowledge that is consulted when humans attempt to simplify incoming sensory information: the label is "schema." "A schema may be defined as a cognitive structure that represents one's general knowledge about a given concept or stimulus domain" (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, p. 13). According to Fiske and Taylor (1984), a schema not only includes the attributes relevant for a given concept but also contains the interrelationships among these attributes. Schema "guide perception, memory and inference in social settings" (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, p. 13). The reader should note that other authors have often used the terms "schema" and "image" interchangeably. In order to avoid the confusion that stems from using multiple labels for a similar concept, the more contemporary term "schema" is exclusively used for the remainder of this book.

If schema serves as both filters and outcomes of the process of social cognition, then an "opinion" concerning a specific topic is a function of the schema related to this topic. An opinion about a particular topic can also be thought of as reflecting one or more aspects of a human being's inference about this topic. What does the field of social cognition tell us about the relationship between schema and inference?

According to Fiske and Taylor (1984), in social cognition, inference is "a process and a product. As a process, it involves deciding what information to gather [in order] to address a given issue or question, collecting that information, and combining it into some form. As a product, it is the outcome of the reasoning process" (p. 246). "The process of deciding what information is relevant and how one is to interpret the evidence is heavily

influenced by preexisting … schema" (p. 248). Figure 2.2 graphically depicts a simplistic process of social cognition and highlights opinion as an outcome.

Figure 2.2

Basic Process of Social Cognition Highlighting Opinion as an Outcome



Figure 2.2 illustrates the notion that an overt opinion about social concept A is a function of an individual's inference about social concept A which, in turn, is a function of an individual's schema related to social concept A. Note that the rectangle representing an individual's schema related to social concept A contains several interrelated cognitive components that, altogether, embody that schema. These cognitive components most likely consist of previously acquired beliefs and attitudes. When an individual's sensory pickup results in information pertaining to social concept A, this information will be processed through that individual's schema related to social concept A. This processing results in an inference about social concept A which influences both subsequent sensory pickup about social concept A and an individual's opinion about social concept A. Due to the important role schema plays in social cognition, and in order for a researcher to understand an individual's expressed opinion about a social concept, it is necessary for him/her to identify the key cognitive components of an individual's schema pertaining to that concept and understand the interrelationships among these components. A schema pertaining to a particular social concept can potentially contain an

infinite number of cognitive components. How can a researcher identify those that are most likely to be key cognitive components? The heuristics perspective, explained below, offers some useful suggestions.

Schemas and Heuristics: Efficiency in Social Cognition

When processing information, individuals tend to take "shortcuts that reduce complex problem solving to more simple judgmental operations" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 268). People will look for "rapid adequate solutions, rather than slow accurate solutions" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 12). These shortcuts are labeled "heuristics" by social cognition researchers. According to Fiske and Taylor (1984), the following are two common heuristics used by individuals:

Representativeness: Based on the characteristics of the situation that I am observing, how likely is this situation to be similar to other situations that I already understand?

Availability: What is the quickest association that comes to mind in relation to the situation that I am observing?

Individuals, then, utilize heuristics to reach inferences based on topic-relevant schemas. The heuristics perspective can help a researcher focus on the most likely key cognitive components of an individual's schema pertaining to a specific social concept.

Schema and Muslim Public Opinion toward the U.S.-led War on Terror

In order to understand how a human being processes and infers a particular sensory cue (e.g., U.S.-led war on terror), one needs to understand this human being's schema relating to that sensory cue. Earlier we noted that schema is "a cognitive structure that represents one's general knowledge about a given concept or stimulus domain" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 13). Schema includes

the attributes relating to that concept and the interrelationships among these attributes. In the case of the U.S.-led war on terror, such attributes include beliefs and attitudes associated with the concept of the U.S.-led war on terror. Thus, in order to understand why the concept of the "U.S.-led war on terror" varies among Muslim populations, we first need to identify the beliefs and attitudes that are part of the schema associated with this concept and detail the interrelationships among them. While there could be a plethora of potential beliefs and attitudes, the heuristics notion within social cognition leads us to expect that individuals will retrieve those beliefs and attitudes that are most readily available and closely associated with aspects of the U.S.-led war on terror.

Ideally, we also need to understand the antecedents of these beliefs and attitudes such as the sources of information and other pertinent factors resulting in these beliefs and attitudes. Similarly, the interrelationships among these antecedents and schema components (i.e., pertinent beliefs and attitudes) also need to be detailed and understood. Figure 2.3 presents a simplistic graphical representation of the relationships between antecedents, schema and opinion.

Figure 2.3



Figure 2.3 illustrates the notion that an opinion about social concept A is a function of an individual's schema pertaining to social concept A which, in turn, is a function of specific antecedents that have influenced the individual cognitive components that embody this schema.

SOME BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF A THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERROR

From the social cognition paradigm presented above, we can develop the following general expectations:

E1: International Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror is related to a specific schema present in the cognitive systems of individual members of this international Muslim public.

E2: This schema in the cognitive systems of individual members of the international Muslim public will consist of various components (beliefs about, and attitudes associated with, the U.S.-led war on terror) that can be identified.

E3: This schema in the cognitive system of individual members of the international Muslim public will consist of beliefs and attitudes that are readily available and most easily associated with the U.S.-led war on terror.

Since the schema components do not exist in a vacuum, we can also expect that:

E4: This schema is a function of specific antecedents that can be identified.

Figure 2.4 graphically represents these basic building blocks.

Figure 2.4



The remainder of this chapter concentrates on identifying potential schema components and antecedents that might explain the variation in international Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror.

What are the Antecedents and Schema Components of International Muslim Public Opinion toward the U.S.-led War on Terror?

Since September 11, 2001, studies investigating international Muslim public opinion toward the United States have solely reported descriptive trends (see Stone, 2002; Pew Center for the People and the Press, 2002; Zogby, 2002; Telhami, 2003). Thus, no specific schema components and/or antecedents of the variation in Muslim support for the U.S.-led war on terror can be empirically extracted from the reports stemming from these studies. Therefore, we need to search the next closest bodies of literature to identify potentially relevant antecedents.

For an individual living in another country, the U.S.-led war on terror is a policy adopted by another country. However, when asked to express his/her level of support for this policy, the individual is being asked to react to a potential personal adoption of this foreign policy. Since the war on terror is waged internationally, taking a stand on the war on terror is taking a personal stand on a foreign policy issue. Thus, as part of a quest for identifying potential antecedents and schema components, the first body of literature to examine is that which focuses on public opinion about foreign policies. In addition, because the United States leads the war on terror, it is highly likely that the schema associated with this war includes beliefs about the U.S. and attitudes toward the U.S. It is also important to determine the sources of information that might have influenced beliefs and attitudes toward the U.S. and toward the U.S.-led war on terror.

For individuals living outside the U.S., the various types of information they would have received about the U.S. fall under the rubric of international communication. Under the umbrella of international communication, two areas of research will be reviewed:

1. Exposure to international news and its relationship to how other countries are perceived; and
2. Exposure to imported entertainment television programs and its relationship to how foreign countries are perceived.

Antecedents and Schema Components of International Public Opinion: A Review of the Literature on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The research literature linking public opinion and foreign policy has traditionally focused on the public opinion of U.S. citizens toward U.S. foreign policy (see Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961; Gamson & Modigliani, 1966; Sigelman & Johnston Conover, 1981; Holsti, 1992). Although the general objective of these studies was to study the link between foreign policy and public opinion, the level of analysis and specificity often varied. Almond (1950), for example, attempted to detail and explain the trends in the U.S. public's level of support for U.S. foreign policies. Rosenau (1961) focused on identifying the process through which U.S. foreign policy is formulated. According to Rosenau (1961), public opinion is one of the factors that are part of the process of foreign policy formulation. Using the language of research methods, for Rosenau (1961), public opinion is a predictor and foreign policy formulation is the dependent variable. By contrast, for Almond (1950), public opinion is the dependent variable and he seeks to identify what affects its fluctuations. Since the book at hand focuses on explaining the variation in international public opinion toward the U.S.-led war on terror, which is itself a foreign policy, the review below solely focuses on studies that consider public opinion toward foreign policy to be the dependent variable.

In a comprehensive analysis and seminal study of the trends in U.S. public opinion toward U.S. foreign policy, Almond (1950) identifies several predictors that explain the variation in public opinion trends: Education, income, preexisting values, gender, and age. Almond is careful to point out that it is impossible to achieve a complete understanding of the relationships between these predictors and the opinion of the U.S. public toward U.S. foreign policy without taking into account the cultural and social contexts in which these attitudes come to exist. In his extensive study, Almond (1950) describes these prevailing cultural and social contexts and illustrates their likely implications on U.S. public opinion about foreign policy. From Almond (1950) we learn that education, income, preexisting values, gender, and age are all potential antecedents of public opinion toward foreign policy. We also learn that the interrelationships between these potential predictors and

public opinion can only be thoroughly understood when we take into account the prevailing social and cultural contexts.

Gamson and Modigliani (1966) introduce a knowledge-based theoretical model for predicting attitudes toward foreign policy. They present three possible models that explain the role of knowledge:

> The enlightenment model: The higher is the level of knowledge, the less likely individuals are to accept confrontational foreign policy attitudes.
> The mainstream model: The higher is the level of knowledge, the more likely individuals are to accept official government policies expressed in public discussions of these foreign policies.
> The cognitive consistency model: The higher is the level of knowledge, the more likely individuals are to "understand more clearly the policy most consistent with… [their] predispositions" (p. 196).

From Gamson and Modigliani (1966), we learn that knowledge about the specific foreign policy is a likely predictor of public opinion toward that foreign policy.

Lau, Brown, and Sears (1978) focus on foreign policy in the context of the Vietnam War. They test whether an individual's self-interest predicts his/her level of support for the war. Lau et al. (1978) conclude: "By and large, civilians' self-interest in the Vietnam War seems not to have had much effect upon their political response to it" (p. 478). From Lau et al. (1978), we learn that "self-interest" is an unlikely predictor of public opinion toward foreign policy.

Sigelman and Johnston Conover (1981) follow up on the work by Gamson and Modigliani (1966). After noting the general lack of theory building in the area of public opinion and foreign policy, they focus on empirically testing the three models put forth by Gamson and Modigliani (1966). They conclude that:

> On the whole, opinions about policy options [….] could not be adequately explained by any of the Gamson-Modigliani models, although the mainstream model seems to have performed somewhat better than the other two models (p. 489).

With the mainstream model emerging as the most adequate for explaining the variation in their data, and since this model involves exposure to public discussion of foreign policies, Sigelman and Johnston Conover's (1981) findings suggest that exposure to media coverage of such discussions is an important predictor of attitudes

toward foreign policy. Sigelman and Johnston Conover's (1981) results also show that knowledge, as a single predictor, is insufficient in explaining the variation in attitudes toward foreign policy. This suggests that the process that influences public opinion toward foreign policy must be more complex than one that can be explained by a single predictor.

Herrmann (1986) is among the few authors in the field of public opinion and foreign policy who utilize the social cognition paradigm and combine it with empirical investigation techniques. His study takes place within the environment of the Cold War and focuses on perceptions of the Soviet Union among U.S. national leaders. He is particularly interested in the relationships between these perceptions and the leaders' stated foreign policy choices. Herrmann (1986) contends that perceptions of the Soviet Union are building blocks of a Soviet containment schema. His empirical tests show that the Soviet containment schema indeed influences the stated foreign policy choices of U.S. national leaders. From Herrmann (1986) we learn that: 1) Public opinion is a function of a relevant schema; and 2) Beliefs about a prominent country that is a political adversary to one's own might be important predictors of international public opinion about foreign policies. This appears to be the case even if the foreign policies about which opinions are expressed do not directly pertain to the prominent country.

Still within the context of the Cold War, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) set out to detail the schema components associated with various foreign policy opinions of a sample of Americans and empirically test the interrelationships among these schema components. They test a structural causal model and demonstrate that, for U.S. respondents, Core Values (i.e., beliefs about morality of war and ethnocentricism) drive General Postures (i.e., militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism) which, in turn, drive Views on Foreign Policy Issues (i.e., defense spending, nuclear arms policy, military involvement, soviet policy, and international trade). The authors found the data they collected to be consistent with their model. From Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) we learn that values and general orientations might be useful schema components related to public opinion about foreign policy and thus serve as predictors of such policy.

Also within the Cold War, Larsen, Csepeli, Dann, Giles, Ommundsen, Elder, and Long (1988) conducted a multinational study of student opinion toward the issue of nuclear disarmament.

They found that opinion about this foreign policy varied along student gender and age. Larsen et al. (1988) also uncovered that an individual's level of authoritarianism, degree of participation in peace demonstrations, level of patriotism, attitudes toward the Soviet Union, belief that the arms race is inevitable, and belief about an eventual nuclear conflict are all predictors of his/her opinion toward nuclear disarmament. We learn from Larsen et al. (1988) that attitudes toward the country associated with the foreign policy in question, various beliefs related to this foreign policy, gender, and age, as well as personality variables, might all be potential schema components and thus predictors of public opinion about foreign policy.

Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi (1997) hypothesize that an individual's perceived relationships between two countries "evoke both cognitive and affective processes that lead to at least four ideal typical images… enemy, ally, colony and degenerate" (p. 403). Herrmann et al. (1997) posit that these "images have identifiable and interrelated components" (p. 403). Through a series of experiments, the authors test their contentions and indeed find that the schema associated with each country image is unified and that affect and cognition are strongly associated. The authors conclude:

> Our experiments treat image as a causal variable and have found that some images are schemata and, once formed, affect the processing of new information, the memory of this information, inference about the meaning of action and policy choice (p. 423).

From Herrmann et al. (1997) we learn that schemas pertaining to countries and foreign policies do indeed affect an individual's foreign policy choices. We also learn that the components of country schemas can be identified and empirically tested.

Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) further refine the model proposed in their 1987 article. The new model is still causal in nature: Core Values and Predispositions (patriotism, moral traditionalism, religious fundamentalism, partisanship, and ideology) drive Soviet Images (trust and threat), which drive Foreign Policy Postures (militarism, containment), which then drive Specific Policy Attitudes (defense spending, nuclear policy, military involvement, contra funding). Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) test this model and find that the data support the relationships that the model proposes. From Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) we learn that core values,

predispositions, beliefs about foreign countries, and foreign policy postures are potential schema components and thus predictors of public opinion toward foreign policy.

Zaller (1992) presents a national and international public opinion model that he labels the Receive-Accept Sample Model (RAS). Reception comes first. Resistance follows. Accessibility comes next and the response comes last.

Zaller (1992) specified his RAS model as being composed of four components:

> A1. Reception Axiom. The greater a person's level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages concerning that issue.
> A2. Resistance Axiom. People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions.
> A3. Accessibility Axiom. The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory, and bring them to the top of the head for use.
> A4. Response Axiom. Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them (pp. 42-49).

Also implicit in the above model is that "predispositions" are key antecedents. Zaller (1992) points out that discussing the notion of "predispositions" is beyond the scope of his book but nevertheless offers that "…predispositions are at least in part a distillation of a person's lifetime experiences, including childhood socialization and direct involvement with the raw ingredients of policy issues…" (p. 23). From Zaller (1992) we learn that public opinion is a function of an individual's involvement in an issue, reception of messages about this issue, consistency of prior knowledge with the messages received and saliency of the issue vis-à-vis the individual. We also learn that predispositions are key antecedents of this entire process.

Wilcox, Tanaka and Allsop (1993) focus on the variation in attitudes toward the same foreign policy issue across various countries. From their study, we learn that public support for a foreign policy decision is a function of multiple predictors that include attitudes toward the countries involved and beliefs about the implications and perceived motivations for the policy.

Marquis and Sciarini (1999) test out the contentions made by Zaller (1992) about the determinants of public opinion formation. Their findings support the argument made by Zaller that "public opinion on major issues is a response to the relative intensity of competing political communications addressing those issues at the elite level" (Marquis & Sciarini, 1999, p. 468). Their findings are thus consistent with those of Sigelman and Johnston Conover's (1981) in that news exposure is an important predictor of public opinion about foreign policy.

Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat (2004) use a "two-wave panel survey and a cross sectional survey" (p. 93) to test whether "[i]n the realm of world affairs, international trust could be a particularly useful heuristic for organizing one's beliefs" about foreign countries. The authors indeed find that "respondents who generally trusted other nations were more likely than those who did not to perceive a wide range of specific nations as friendly and unthreatening, as well as to favor internationalism as a general principle" (p. 105). From Brewer et al. (2004) we learn that "trust" could be an important predictor of public opinion about foreign policy; we also learn that internationalism, party identification, gender, age and education are also important predictors.

The literature review on foreign policy and public opinion has identified numerous potential predictors and schema components of international public opinion. These will be compiled and integrated into a later section of this chapter. Among the key predictors of public opinion identified above is exposure to public political communication (Sigelman & Johnston Conover, 1981; Marquis & Sciarini, 1999). It is therefore important to also review the literature pertaining to the effects of news exposure on public opinion concerning foreign countries.

Antecedents of International Public Opinion: The Role of News Exposure

Shortly after World War II, researchers realized the importance of news media in shaping the perceptions of the public in country A toward the government and people in country B. Buchanan and Cantril (1953) highlighted this contention:

> Certain acts of [other countries'] governments come to our attention. Because we are unable to 'see' these acts personally, we are dependent on interpreters – usually the mass media of communication – to describe them to us. Since even the best informed are too far removed and too ill informed on the context in which these acts occur to understand the motives that underlie them, we must either ignore them or find some simplified explanation. The sort of explanation that is most intelligible is one in terms of individuals, since it is with individuals that our daily transactions occur. We have found it useful in the past to type persons by the characteristics they have exhibited toward us; it is therefore, not unreasonable to employ the same device in assigning characteristics to foreign people as reflected by the acts of their representatives, official or unofficial (p. 96).

The 1980s witnessed a renewal of interest in the subject matter of international news and its potential impact on the perceptions of foreign countries portrayed in the news. This resurgence most probably occurred as a result of the debate concerning the role of international news in what was labeled the New World Information Order (see Masmoudi, 1979).

Perry (1985) uses an experimental design to test the effect of unrepresentative news stories on the accuracy of inferences about foreign countries. The author concludes: individuals "who read an unrepresentative news story made less accurate inferences about prototypical countries than did respondents who read no story" (p. 608). From Perry (1985) we learn that biased news exposure can influence public opinion about foreign countries.

McNelly and Izcaray (1986) investigate the impact of exposure to international news as one of several predictors of opinions about foreign countries. Their study was conducted in Venezuela and focuses on opinions toward Mexico, Cuba, India, U.S., France, and the USSR. The predictors include: age, gender, education, living standard, exposure to TV series and movies from specific countries, and knowledge about specific countries. In terms of the effects of these predictors on respondents' liking of specific countries, McNelly and Izcaray (1986) find that age (except in the equations for Cuba and India), international news exposure, knowledge about specific countries, and exposure to TV series and movies (except in the equations for Cuba and India) are all statistically significant predictors. From McNelly and Izcaray (1986) we learn that exposure to international news, exposure to imported entertainment media, age, and knowledge about specific countries can potentially influence public opinion toward specific foreign countries.

Perry (1987) builds upon Perry (1985) to test a very similar relationship. Again, Perry (1987) finds that exposure to biased news can lead to mistaken inferences about foreign countries.

Korzenny, del Toro, and Gaudino (1987) also set out to investigate the effect of international news, specifically comparing print to electronic media. The results of this study are mixed. Overall, exposure to print media is found to be a more stable predictor in comparison to exposure to other media content. The authors conclude: "…[T]he medium seems to make a difference under certain circumstances and for certain topics. Not all media, however, are equal in their possible impact" (p. 84). From Korzenny et al. (1987) we learn that exposure to news media is an unlikely direct predictor of opinions toward other countries. From this finding we infer that the influence of news media exposure is likely to be indirect, as it is most likely mediated by other variables.

Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab (1991) test a theoretical model of news media effect (newspaper, radio, and television) on German residents' support for specific resolutions to domestic and foreign conflicts. The model has a causal structure and contends that an individual's value system drives his/her usage of mass media, which, in turn, drives the information that the individual receives which then drives the knowledge that the respondent has about the issues and finally drives the individual's positions on resolving the various issues. In addition to the simple causal chain and the indirect effect that it embodies, the model also contends that there will be a direct effect between the individual's value system and his/her positions on the issues, and a direct effect between the information received about the issues and the individual's positions on these issues. The authors find the following:

1. The value system ha[s] a moderate impact on the usage of mass media.
2. The value system ha[s] a moderate to strong impact on positions on issues.
3. The information about eight [specific] events [associated with] each conflict ha[s] a moderate impact on the familiarity with these events.
4. The familiarity with the eight instrumental events ha[s] a moderate impact on positions on issues.
5. The information available on all instrumental events ha[s] a moderate impact on positions on issues (Kepplinger et al., 1991, p. 153).

From Kepplinger et al. (1991) we learn that an individual's value system, familiarity with international policies, level of exposure to

media, and information about international policies stemming from such media exposure, might all be important predictors and schema components of international public opinion. We also learn that these predictors are likely to be causally linked.

Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, and Willnat (1992) first investigate the effect of age, gender, education, contact with foreign countries, interest in politics, exposure and attention to television and newspaper coverage about foreign affairs on Americans' public opinion about nine foreign countries. Each of these predictors is found to be statistically significant for at least one of the nine foreign countries. Semetko et al. (1992) then focus on opinions about West Germany and add to their analysis additional predictors specific to West Germany: Having German ancestors, having German friends and relatives, visited Europe. This portion of their study finds that, when these variables are added, the exposure to newspaper and television news is no longer significant predictors. From Semetko et al. (1992) we learn that attention to newspaper coverage and attention to television news coverage, along with interest in politics, age, education, gender, and the contact measures (ancestry from the specific foreign country, friends and relatives in that foreign country, visits to the area where that foreign country is located) are all potential predictors of opinion toward a specific foreign country.

Brewer, Graf and Willnat (2003) use an experimental design to test whether "exposure to media coverage of domestic terrorism and domestic illegal drug use" (p. 498) can prime or frame how individuals perceive countries historically associated with terrorism and drugs in the news. The authors find that when their respondents "read stories that offered a direct link between an issue and a nation that carried a specific evaluative implication, they tended to adopt this frame of reference in their own thinking" (p. 504). Brewer, Graf and Willnat's (2003) results support the framing effect but not the priming effect. From this study we learn that exposure to news coverage about foreign countries can frame how individuals perceive foreign countries.

Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2004) re-analyze Gallup data originally collected to describe Muslim public opinion about the U.S. They note that "[m]ost individuals, regardless of their location in the world, rely on their preexisting views and the information most readily available to them in the news media as the mutable material from which to mold their opinions" (p. 20). Their

analysis identifies empirically-derived predictors of Muslims' attitudes toward the United States. Nisbet et al. (2004) recognize the importance of contextual antecedents and take these into account in the form of macro-level variables (e.g., various indicators of development, etc.). They also identify a series of micro-level predictors (e.g., exposure to Pan-Arab satellite news, etc.). Nisbet et al. (2004) utilize multiple regression analysis to evaluate the relative influence of each of their predictors onto an "index of anti-American attitudes" (p. 25). They find that anti-American attitudes are greatest when the respondent:

- Is not a woman;
- Has a higher level of education;
- Spends more time watching TV;
- Watches Pan-Arab satellite news;
- Pays strong attention to news coverage of the United States;
- Believes that Western nations do not show concern for Muslim nations; and
- Believes that Western nations treat Muslim nations unfairly.

Nisbet et al. (2004) highlight the relationship between news media intake and attitude, noting that:

> …an individual living in a predominantly Muslim country is likely to use his or her underlying anti-American predisposition as a 'perceptual screen' accepting only those considerations featured in the news that are congenial to his or her preconceived attitudes toward the United States, rejecting aspects of the news that are not (p. 21).

Evidence from their analysis "indicates that TV news viewing has an important influence on anti-American attitudes among Muslims, above and beyond any macro-level or sociodemographic factors" (p.31). From Nisbet et al. (2004), we learn that gender, level of education, exposure to TV and TV news, involvement in news coverage about the U.S., and beliefs about the United States can all be predictors and schema components of international Muslim public opinion toward the U.S.

The literature on news and opinion of foreign countries has revealed numerous potential predictors and schema components of international public opinion. These will be compiled and integrated into a later section of this chapter.

In addition to exposure to international news about a particular foreign country, individuals in country B can also potentially learn about foreign country B via exposure to foreign country A's entertainment television programs that are available in country B.

Antecedents of International Public Opinion: The Role of Exposure to Imported Entertainment TV Programs

There is no doubt that technological advances of the 20th century have made information about other countries much more available worldwide. This availability was noticed early on in the form of imported TV programs that appeared in the domestic schedules of the majority of developing countries. Despite the fact that, in the last decade, reliance on mostly imported American TV programs has significantly diminished (Straubhaar et al., 1992; Straubhaar, 2003), American TV programs are still present in the television schedules of foreign countries and still depict mediated aspects of American life (see "Building a Global Audience," 1997). The question is whether these media presentations can affect the viewers' beliefs and attitudes toward the United States. Since the 1960s, the issue of imported TV influence has been addressed by investigating its potential effects on behaviors, knowledge, values, beliefs, and attitudes (Elasmar and Hunter, 2003).

Can imported television content be a source of influence upon local viewers who are exposed to it? Hur (1982) conducts a narrative review of the existing empirical literature about the effects of foreign TV programs. Hur (1982) concludes that "exposure to American television and film content by local populations has few cognitive and attitudinal effects, much less behavioral effects" (p. 546). Yaple and Korzenny (1989) conduct a similar literature review and conclude that "media effects across national cultural groups are detectable but relatively small in magnitude, and that ... the environment, cultural situation, and context affect selectivity and the interpretation of content" (p. 313).

Elasmar and Hunter (2003) use the technique of meta-analysis to assess the entire body of quantitative studies about this same topic. After an extensive analysis of the results of past investigations, Elasmar and Hunter (2003) find that the effect varied across studies and across effect types (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, etc.). After

computing average effect sizes across studies, Elasmar and Hunter (2003) conclude that foreign TV exposure, overall, has a weak impact upon its audience members.

The results of both narrative and quantitative reviews of the empirical literature suggest that finding an effect will depend upon an interaction between audience characteristics and effect type (e.g., cognitive, attitudinal, behavioral, etc.). The wide variation in effect sizes across individual studies also tend to demonstrate this interaction. For example, a study examining the influence of U.S. TV exposure on the adoption of Western sex role values among individuals in Taiwan finds no foreign TV effect (Wu, 1989). Payne and Peake (1977) report a similar finding when exploring the intention of immigrating to the U.S. among people in Iceland. However, a study exploring the impact of U.S. TV exposure on the adoption of U.S. values by individuals in Trinidad finds a moderate size effect (Skinner, 1984). A moderate to strong effect is also found by Oliveira (1986) when investigating the influence of U.S. TV on attitudes toward consuming U.S. products by individuals in Belize. Tables 2.1 through 2.5 depict the variation in effect sizes across studies and across effect types as reported in Elasmar and Hunter (2003).

Table 2.1

The Impact of Foreign TV: Summary of Behavioral Effects

Author(s)	*Sample**	*Country*	*Behavior(s)*	*r*
Oliveira (1986)	96	Columbia	Use of American consumer products	.21
Kang & Morgan (1988)	226	Korea	Wearing jeans	.24

Source: Elasmar and Hunter (2003)
*Sample size corresponding to the specific relationship(s) is reported when available. Otherwise, total study sample size is reported.

Table 2.2

The Impact of Foreign TV: Summary of Knowledge-Based Effects

Author(s)	*Sample**	Country	*Knowledge*	*r*
Payne (1978)	694	United States	Knowledge of Canadian issues	.36
Payne & Caron (1982)	646	Canada	Knowledge of U.S. issues	.09

Source: Elasmar and Hunter (2003)
*Sample size corresponding to the specific relationship(s) is reported when available. Otherwise, total study sample size is reported.

Table 2.3

The Impact of Foreign TV: Summary of Value-Based Effects

Author(s)	*Sample**	*Country*	*Values*	*r*
Tsai (1967)	160	Taiwan	General Western versus Eastern values	.08
Skinner (1984)	297	Trinidad	General U.S. values	.33
Kang & Morgan (1988)	226	Korea	Western versus traditional sex role values	.09
Zhao (1989)	990	China	General Western versus traditional values	.09
Wu (1989)	1,214	Taiwan	Western versus traditional sex role values	.06
Geiger (1992)	605	Venezuela	General U.S. versus Venezuelan values	.03
Chaffee et al. (1995)	1,862	China	General Western versus traditional values	.22

Source: Elasmar and Hunter (2003)
*Sample size corresponding to the specific relationship(s) is reported when available. Otherwise, total study sample size is reported.

Table 2.4

The Impact of Foreign TV: Summary of Attitudinal Effects

Author(s)	*Sample**	*Country*	*Attitude*	*r*
Tsai (1967)	598	Taiwan	Attitudes toward U.S. and American cultural products	.13
Payne & Peake (1977)	39	Iceland	Choice of U.S. to immigrate	.04
Payne (1978)	414	United States	Attitudes toward Canada	-.10
Payne & Caron (1982)	646	Canada	Attitudes toward the United States	.08
Oliveira (1986)	96	Belize	Attitudes toward consumption of U.S. products	.42
Kang & Morgan (1988)	226	Korea	Attitudes toward rock and roll	.12

Source: Elasmar and Hunter (2003)
*Sample size corresponding to the specific relationship(s) is reported when available. Otherwise, total study sample size is reported.

Table 2.5

The Impact of Foreign TV: Summary of Belief-based Effects

Author(s)	*Sample**	*Country*	*Belief(s)*	*r*
Tsai (1967)	598	Taiwan	Beliefs about Americans	.18
Payne (1978)	414	U.S.A.	Various beliefs consistent with presentations on Canadian TV	-.01
Pingree & Hawkins (1981)	1280	Australia	Beliefs about the U.S. and Australia	.05
Skinner (1984)	297	Trinidad	Beliefs about the U.S.	.25
Weimann (1984)	461	Israel	Beliefs about the U.S.	.38
Tan & Suarcharvart (1988)	279	Thailand	Beliefs about Americans	.07
Choi (1989)	222	Korea	Beliefs about the U.S.	.05
Wu (1989)	1214	Taiwan	Beliefs about the U.S.	-.02
Ahn (1990)	705	Korea	Beliefs about the U.S.	.13
El-Koussa & Elasmar (1995)	481	Lebanon	Beliefs about the U.S.	.09
Akaishi & Elasmar (1995)	496	Japan	Beliefs about the U.S.	.05

Source: Elasmar and Hunter (2003)
*Sample size corresponding to the specific relationship(s) is reported when available. Otherwise, total study sample size is reported.

Tables 2.1 through 2.5 show that, while one researcher might find no impact for foreign TV exposure on particular viewers, another might find an impact when examining other viewers. Effects seem to vary across samples and even within samples. This suggests that a complex process of influence is at work. To address this

complexity, Elasmar (2003) proposes the Susceptibility to Imported Media (SIM) model based on the integration of related findings from across several fields of inquiry. The SIM model contends that the present attitudes of individuals in country B toward foreign country A are directly influenced by the consumption of foreign country A's entertainment TV programs that are available in country B. The SIM model also claims that the consumption of foreign country A's entertainment TV programs is a function of previous attitudes toward the content of country A's TV programs and a preexisting affinity toward country A. Additionally, the model asserts that the attitude toward the content of country A's TV programs and the preexisting affinity toward country A are a function of the demographics of the individuals in country B, their preexisting knowledge about country A, preexisting beliefs about country A, preexisting values, perceived utility of foreign TV content from country B, and involvement in foreign TV content from country A.

Elasmar (2003) uses the SIM model to make predictions about the profile of the local TV viewer who will most likely be positively influenced by his/her exposure to imported TV programs. A positive influence, in this context, means that the viewer will hold a positive attitude and/or acquire positive beliefs as a result of exposure to these programs. According to Elasmar (2003), the viewers who are most likely susceptible for being positively influenced by imported TV programs are those who:

a. Have a preexisting positive attitude toward the country that is perceived to be the source of the imported TV program. This is consistent with the findings concerning preexisting affinity reported by Elasmar and Sim (1997): having friends and/or relatives in the U.S. and having learned favorable information from one's parents about the U.S. are positive predictors of exposure to U.S. TV and positive indirect predictors of a liking of U.S. fast food. This profile characteristic is also compatible with the findings on persuasion reported by Chaiken and Eagly (1983), the results concerning intergroup relations reported by Bornstein (1993) and the consumer behavior findings related to "country of origin" research reported by Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999);
b. Are compatible linguistically with the imported TV program. Straubhaar (2003) found that linguistic compatibility was a clear predictor of exposure to international TV;
c. Have values that are compatible with the source and contents of the imported TV program. Straubhaar (2003) found that cultural proximity and cultural capital predict a viewer's exposure to

international TV programming and facilitate his/her decoding of the message imbedded in that program. This requirement of a compatible value schema is also consistent with the findings about interpreting "Dallas" reported by Liebes and Katz (1993) and processing of new educational information reported by Renzulli and Dai (2001);

d. Are not negatively prejudiced against the source or content. This is consistent with the literature about the contact hypothesis summarized by Stephan (1987);
e. Perceive one or more "utilities" for self in the content of the imported TV program and are involved in such content. The concept of utility put forth by Katz (1968) combined with the concept of involvement that is central to the persuasion literature (see Cacioppo, Petty, Kao & Rodriguez, 1986; Stiff, 1986; Johnson & Eagly, 1989);
f. Will frequently watch one or more imported TV programs stemming from the same foreign source. In this case, an interaction between exposure frequency to imported programs and a preexisting affinity toward the source of those programs will produce the strongest effects (see Bornstein, 1993).

In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of imported entertainment television on domestic viewers, together with the SIM model, suggest that while imported TV programs do not have a homogenous influence across individuals and effect types, they can be influential. From the SIM model we learn that, in addition to consumption of imported entertainment TV programs, demographics, preexisting knowledge about the foreign country, preexisting beliefs about the foreign country, preexisting values, perceived utility of foreign TV content, involvement in foreign TV content, attitude toward the foreign TV content and preexisting affinity toward the foreign country can all be potential predictors of opinion toward that foreign country (Elasmar, 2003).

U.S. television programs have long been present in the domestic schedules of most countries (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974; Varis, 1993; "Building a Global Audience," 1997), including those with Muslim populations. It is therefore reasonable to consider this exposure variable as a source of information about the U.S. and thus a potential antecedent of international Muslim public opinion about the U.S.

BUILDING A THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION

From the literature reviews on public opinion and foreign policy, exposure to international news, and exposure to imported entertainment TV programs, we can identify numerous potential predictors and/or schema components of international public opinion. Altogether, they can be categorized into the following general building blocks of a theoretical model of public opinion formation and variation: Demographics, Predispositions, Media Exposure, Beliefs, and Attitudes. The demographic predictors can be conceptualized as potential antecedents of individuals' schemas. The other predictors (i.e., predispositions, media exposure, beliefs and attitudes) can be conceptualized as potential schema components. Table 2.6 compiles the predictors identified by the various bodies of literature reviewed earlier.

Table 2.6

Building Blocks of a Theoretical Model of International Public Opinion Formation

Building Block	*Variable*	*Examples of Source*
Demographics	Education	(Almond, 1950; Semetko et al., 1992; Brewer et al., 2004; Nisbet et al., 2004)
	Income	(Almond, 1950)
	Gender	(Almond, 1950; Larsen et al., 1988; Semetko et al., 1992; Brewer et al., 2004; Nisbet et al., 2004)
	Age	(Almond, 1950; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Larsen et al., 1988; Semetko et al., 1992; Brewer et al., 2004)
Predispositions	Preexisting values	(Almond, 1950; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Kepplinger et al., 1991; Elasmar, 2003)

(Continued on next page)

Table 2.6 (continued)

Building Blocks of a Theoretical Model of International Public Opinion Formation

Building Block	*Variable*	*Examples of Source*
Predispositions (continued)	Knowledge	(Gamson & Modigliani, 1966; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Sigelman & Johnston Conover. 1981; Kepplinger et al., 1991; Elasmar, 2003)
	Interpersonal contacts with aspects of foreign country	(Semetko et al., 1992; Elasmar and Sim, 1998)
	Pessimism about the future (e.g., belief of eventual nuclear conflict, etc.)	(Larsen et al., 1988)
	Ideological beliefs (e.g., militarism, isolationism, internationalism, etc.)	(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Brewer et al., 2004)
	Personality attributes (e.g., authoritarianism, patriotism, ethnocentrism, etc.)	(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Larsen et al., 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Brewer et al., 2004)
	Preexisting affinity	(Elasmar & Sim, 1998; Elasmar, 2003)
Media Exposure	Attention to news coverage	(Semetko et al., 1992; Nisbet et al., 2004)
	Exposure to news	(Sigelman & Johnston Conover, 1981; Perry, 1985; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Perry, 1987; Kepplinger et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992; Marquis & Sciarini, 1999; Nisbet et al., 2004)
	Exposure to imported entertainment media	(Tsai, 1976; Oliveira, 1986; Skinner, 1984; Weimann, 1984; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Ahn, 1990; Elasmar, 2003)
Beliefs	Beliefs related to foreign country	(Herrmann, 1986; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Herrmann et al., 1997; Wilcox, Tanaka & Allsop, 1993; Elasmar, 2003; Nisbet et al., 2004; Brewer et al., 2004)
	Beliefs related to the foreign policy (e.g., salience, etc.)	(Larsen et al., 1988; Zaller, 1992; Elasmar, 2003)
Attitudes	Attitudes related to the foreign country	(Larsen et al., 1988; Wilcox, Tanaka & Allsop, 1993; Herrmann et al., 1997; Elasmar, 2003)

In addition to the above, since the dependent variable that is the focus of this book is "international opinion about a prominent foreign policy adopted by a country other than one's own," this dependent variable subsumes the notion of "a foreign country" (e.g., the United States for those living elsewhere) and "the topical focus of the foreign policy" (e.g., terrorism). It is thus reasonable to take into account not only beliefs and attitudes about the "foreign country," but also beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the "topical focus of the foreign policy." The building blocks included in Table 2.5, in addition to beliefs and attitudes about the "topical focus of the foreign policy," can be proposed as components of a theoretical model that can potentially explain the variation in the public opinion of people in country B toward the foreign policies of the government in country A (see Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5

Predictors of Public Opinion among Individuals in Country B about the Prominent Foreign Policies Adopted by Country A



Figure 2.5 illustrates the preliminary building blocks of a model of international public opinion formation pertaining to foreign policies adopted by countries other than one's own.

The literature review suggests that such a model will be causal (Kepplinger et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992; Wilcox, Tanaka & Allsop, 1993; Elasmar, 2003) with demographics and predispositions as antecedents. The structure of this model can be further specified by referring to the findings of a long-standing research program that has consistently shown that beliefs precede their corresponding attitudes (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Further, since the literature review on the influence of news exposure and consumption of imported media has shown that these media variables can influence beliefs and attitudes, we hypothesize that media exposure precedes current beliefs and current attitudes. Further, the influence of the predictors identified in Figure 2.5 cannot be understood without taking into account the cultural and social contexts of the individuals whose opinions are being measured (Almond, 1950). Figure 2.6 depicts a preliminary model of international public opinion formation in country B about a prominent foreign policy adopted by country A.

Figure 2.6

A Preliminary Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) in Country B about a Prominent Foreign Policy Adopted by Country A



We can apply the model depicted in Figure 2.6 to the dependent variable at the center of focus in this book: Muslim populations' level of support for the U.S.-led war on terror. Figure 2.7 illustrates the hypothesized interrelationships in a theoretical model that focuses on explaining the variation in Muslim populations' support for the U.S. led war on terror.

Figure 2.7

A Preliminary Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) of Muslim Populations about the U.S.-led War on Terror



Figure 2.7 depicts that predispositions and demographics predict media exposure, which in turn predicts beliefs about the U.S. and beliefs about terrorism, which then predict attitudes toward the U.S. and attitudes toward terrorism, respectively. Attitudes toward the U.S. and attitudes toward terrorism, finally, predict the level of support for the U.S.-led war on terror. The illustration in Figure 2.7 represents what I call a Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) of Muslim populations toward the U.S.-led war on terror.

From the illustration in Figure 2.7, we can draw the following hypotheses:

H1: Support for the U.S.-led war on terror will be a function of attitudes toward the U.S.;

H2: Attitude toward the U.S. will be a function of belief about the U.S.;

H3: Belief about the U.S. will be a function of media exposure (i.e., exposure to international news and exposure to imported U.S. TV programs);

H4: Media exposure will be a function of demographics; and

H5: Media exposure will be a function of various predispositions.

In addition to the above hypotheses, I also propose three research questions:

RQ1: Is media exposure a predictor of beliefs about terrorism?

RQ2: Are beliefs about terrorism predictors of attitude toward terrorism?

RQ3: Is attitude toward terrorism a predictor of an individual's support for the U.S.-led war on terror?

Chapter 3 of this book details the methodology adopted to empirically test the MIPO model illustrated in Figure 2.7 and reports the overall results stemming from this testing. Chapters 4 though 10 will test this model within each of seven countries with a substantial Muslim population. Chapter 11 will present a refined version of the overall MIPO and draw general theoretical implications. Chapter 12 focuses on the implications of this book's findings for public diplomacy.

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CHAPTER

3

From Conceptual to Operational: Methodology for Testing a Model of Muslim Public Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terror

Chapter 2 proposes a conceptual model of Muslim public support for the U.S.-led war on terror. The purpose of the present chapter is to operationalize the model proposed in Chapter 2 in order to empirically test it. The data used in this chapter and throughout this book was collected in 2002 by the Pew Center for the People and the Press as part of their "Pew Global Attitudes Project" (Pew Research Center, 2002). The "Pew Global Attitudes Project" (PGAP) consists of a long public opinion survey administered to samples of people living in many countries (Pew Research Center, 2002). The survey covers many topical areas but focuses especially on how the people in various countries perceive the United States. Since the data provided here are from 2002, this researcher is aware that the response patterns are likely to have changed since that time due to the various international conflicts that have occurred since 2002. The data, however, are still very useful since the focus in this book is on the interrelationships among the various model components rather than on the trends that exists within each of these components. While the variation within each component is likely to fluctuate over time, this author believes that the interrelationships among components are not subject to such fluctuation. This book utilizes a small portion of the PGAP data collected in selected countries with a significant Muslim population (see below). The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented in this book.

COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

The PGAP countries chosen for inclusion in this study are: Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Together, they cover the following world regions: Middle East, Asia, and Africa. For the purposes of this book, the PGAP samples corresponding to the countries listed above were filtered so that only individuals identifying themselves as Muslims in a particular country are included in the data set corresponding to that country. Additionally, following the recommendation of Gilljam and Granberg (1993), all "don't know" and "refused" responses were considered neither indicative of a lack of opinion nor indicative of a specific opinion, and thus were treated as missing data. All analyses were carried out with listwise deletion of missing data, resulting in a total sample size of N=3,795. This total sample size is broken down as follows: Turkey: n=560, Lebanon: n=423, Egypt: n=452, Senegal: n=585, Nigeria: n=233, Pakistan: n=800, and Indonesia: n=742.

AN OPERATIONAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

A careful review of the PGAP questionnaire was carried out in order to identify measures that can operationalize the variables in the model depicted in Figure 2.7 of Chapter 2. The following are the resulting measures that were integrated into the operational model.

Demographics

Age

PGAP Q74 asks: "How old were you at your last birthday?" Range 18-96; 97= 97 or older.

Education

PGAP Q84 asks: "What is the highest level of education that you have completed?"

Since various countries have different systems of education, the education categories in the PGAP data set varied greatly among countries. In order to enable the reporting of the variation in education in a uniform manner across countries, a unified set of categories was developed and the education response categories originally reported in the PGAP data set were recoded as follows: 1=none; 2=incomplete primary; 3=complete primary; 4=incomplete secondary; 5=complete secondary; 6=incomplete college; 7=complete college.

Gender

PGAP Q73: Gender (Interviewer record by observation). This variable was recoded as follows: 0=Male; 1=Female.

Values: Preexisting Values

Traditional Islamic values about the role of women

This model component embodies one dimension of an individual's values. PGAP Q53d asks: "For each statement, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with the statement: Women should be able to work outside the home." Using the same response categories, PGAP Q53b states: "Women should have the right to decide if they wear a veil." These two items were recoded so that a higher score indicates more traditional Islamic values about the role of women: 4=completely disagree; 3=mostly disagree; 2=mostly agree; 1=completely agree.

Traditional Islamic values about the role of religion in politics

This model component represents another dimension of an individual's values. PGAP Q52 asks: "And how much of a role do you think Islam SHOULD play in the political life of our country – a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?" This item was recoded so that a higher score indicates more traditional Islamic value about the role of Islam in politics: 4=very large role; 3=fairly large role; 2=fairly small role; 1=very small role.

Preexisting affinity toward imported media content

The PGAP did not contain any measures that directly capture the respondents' preexisting affinity toward the U.S. Instead, it included measures that can be construed as indicators of a preexisting affinity toward media products imported from other countries. PGAP Q26 asks: "What about the way movies, TV, and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country) – do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country?" PGAP Q30 asks: "And do you think that having the opportunity to watch movies and TV and listen to music from different parts of the world is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad for you and your family?" These two items were recoded so that a higher score indicates greater preexisting affinity toward imported media: 5=very good; 4=somewhat good; 2=somewhat bad; 1=very bad.

Openness to international trade and exchanges

PGAP Q24 asks: "What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country?" This item and the other three below were recoded so that a higher score indicates greater openness to international trade and exchanges: 4=very good; 3=somewhat good; 2=somewhat bad; 1=very bad. The other three items were: PGAP Q25: "And what about the faster communication and greater travel between the people of (survey country) and people in other countries – do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country?"; PGAP Q28: "All in all, how do you feel about the world becoming more connected through greater economic trade and faster communication – do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country?"; and PGAP Q29: "Now thinking about you and your family – do you think the growing trade and business ties between our country and other countries are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad for you and your family?"

Beliefs

Belief that the United States does not take into account other countries' interests when formulating its foreign policies

PGAP Q62 asks: "In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?" This item was reverse coded so that the higher score reflects greater belief that the U.S. ignores the interests of the survey country: 1=takes into account a great deal; 2=takes into account a fair amount; 3=not too much; 4=not at all.

Belief that terrorism is a problem for one's own country

PGAP Q15f asks: "Here is a list of things that may be problems in our country. As I read each one, please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all: Terrorism." This item was recoded so that a higher score indicates greater belief that terrorism is a problem: 4=very big problem; 3=moderately big problem; 2=small problem; 1=not a problem at all.

Exposure to Media

Likelihood of consuming U.S. imported entertainment media

No direct measure of imported U.S. media consumption was included in the PGAP. However, from a cognitive processing perspective, meta-analytic results show that the best estimate of a behavior is a person's attitude toward that behavior (Kim & Hunter, 1993; Kraus, 1995). In the absence of a direct measure of U.S. media consumption, a measure of attitude toward U.S. entertainment media will be used as a proxy or best available estimate for the probability of consuming imported U.S. entertainment media. As a result, PGAP Q70 is chosen as that proxy. It asks: "Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television." This item was recoded into a binary variable and respondents who gave 'don't know' answers were eliminated from the analysis. The codes for this variable were as

follows: 0=I dislike American music, movies and television; 1= I like American music, movies and television. A "1" indicates a greater probability of being a consumer of U.S. imported entertainment media while zero indicates a lesser probability of being a consumer of U.S. imported entertainment media.

Exposure to international news channels

PGAP Q60c asks: "Do you watch an international news channel such as… [See PGAP codebook for examples of international news channels given to the respondents in each country]." The answer categories were recoded as follows: 0=No and 1=Yes. This is a direct measure of exposure to international news channels. However, since it is binary, its codes are interpreted in the same way as those of the exposure to imported U.S. media: zero indicates a lesser probability of watching international news channels whereas a "1" indicates a greater probability of watching such news channels.

Attitudes

Attitude toward the United States

PGAP Q61b asks: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States." This item was recoded so that a high score reflects a positive attitude toward the U.S.: 4=very favorable; 3=somewhat favorable; 2=somewhat unfavorable; 1=very unfavorable. Here again, respondents who indicated a 'don't know' were eliminated from the analysis.

Attitude toward terrorism

PGAP Q55 asks: "Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?" This item was recoded so that a higher score indicates a

more positive attitude toward terrorism: 4=often justified; 3=sometimes justified; 2=rarely justified; 1=never justified.

Probability of supporting the U.S.-led war on terror

PGAP Q72 asks: "And which comes closer to describing your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism." This item was recoded so that a high score indicates support for the U.S.-led war on terror: 0=I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, and 1=I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism. Here again, since this item is binary, zero is interpreted as a lesser probability of supporting the U.S.-led war on terror whereas a "1" is interpreted as a greater probability of supporting the U.S.-led war on terror.

The variables above were integrated into an operational Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) illustrated in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1

An Operational Model of International Muslim Public Opinion about the U.S.-Led War on Terror (MIPO)

Considerations Taken When Preparing the Data for Analysis

Since the operational Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) depicted in Figure 3.1 illustrates a structural model, it was anticipated that a structural equation modeling (SEM) technique would be used to empirically test it. In preparation for using an SEM approach, utmost care was taken in order for such testing to result in undistorted findings. West, Finch and Curran (1995) warn that many researchers inadvertently violate the assumptions at the heart of the most common approaches to SEM testing. "The commonly used approaches to estimating the parameters of structural equation models, maximum likelihood and normal theory generalized least squares, assume the measured variables are continuous and have a multivariate normal distribution" (West, Finch & Curran, 1995, p. 56). Violating these assumptions can have devastating effects on the robustness of the algorithms at the heart of the SEM approaches that rely on them, resulting in outright biased models. Thus, a priority of this author became to find the best SEM analytic approach given the particular characteristics of the measures used in the operational MIPO.

With respect to the continuous variable assumption, researchers have found that scales with few categories do not emulate the characteristics of continuous variables (Olsson, 1979). Scales with four or fewer response categories are especially problematic in that respect (Johnson and Creech, 1983) whereas scales with five or more response categories seem to approximate the characteristics of continuous variables (Bollen and Barb, 1981). The fewer the number of response categories, the more likely these measures are to also violate the multivariate normal distribution assumption of the most common approaches to SEM testing. If a researcher anticipates using measures that are not continuous and/or non-normally distributed, then West, Finch and Curran (1995) suggest using different techniques for estimating model fit. These alternative procedures include Browne's (1984) asymptotically distribution free (ADF) technique and Muthen's (1984) continuous/categorical variable methodology (CVM) that allows for combining "dichotomous, ordered polytomous and interval-scaled measured variables" (West, Finch and Curran, 1995, p. 68) in the same model.

Given that most measures in the operational MIPO depicted in Figure 3.1 consist of four or fewer categories, it became clear to this

researcher that the most common approaches to SEM, maximum likelihood and normal theory generalized least squares, would not be suitable for the analysis conducted in this book. As a result, a careful search was conducted to locate a statistical package that uses the alternative SEM procedures suggested by West, Finch and Curran (1995).

Analytic Procedures

Descriptive analyses were carried out using SPSS 12.0. All tests of the operational MIPO in this book were conducted in Mplus 3.13 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2005). Mplus was found to be consistent with the alternative SEM procedures described by West, Finch and Curran (1995). To estimate the model's parameters, a weighted least squares approach with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) was used. This is an asymptotically distribution-free (ADF) estimator that is suitable for analyzing models with categorical outcomes (Muthen, du Toit, & Spisic, 1997; Herzberg & Beauducel, 2004; Muthen, 2006). In the proposed operational MIPO, several of the dependent variables are categorical. In addition, some of the categorical dependent variables also serve as predictors for other dependent variables. For example, the "likelihood of consuming imported U.S. media" is a binary endogenous variable that acts as a dependent variable for the predictors that precede it and as a predictor for two other variables: "attitude toward the U.S." and "probability of supporting the U.S.-led war on terror."

This study adopted a two-step approach to structural equation modeling as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The first step consisted of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Maximum Likelihood (ML) for the multiple item measures identified earlier. The multiple item measures belonged to the following latent variables: "Traditional Islamic beliefs about the role of women" and "Preexisting affinity toward imported media content." After confirming the measurement model, a test of the structure of the attitude model was carried out to test the theoretically-justified directional paths hypothesized in the operational MIPO. The overall fit of the proposed MIPO was assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) and

the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger & Lind, 1980; Steiger, 1998). A CFI value close to .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and a RMSEA value of .06 or smaller (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Yu & Muthen, 2002) were considered to indicate a good fit.

As was noted earlier, the weighted least squares approach with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) technique offered by Mplus overcomes the limitations of maximum likelihood and normal theory generalized least squares when a researcher's measures cannot be assumed to be continuous and have a multivariate normal distribution. Under these conditions, the WLSMV, relative to the more common approaches to SEM testing, will yield the most unbiased tests of fit. Thus, using the WLSMV approach, the researcher is able to accept or reject a specific model by relying on the overall tests of fit provided by Mplus. However, when dealing with binary dependent variables, the WLSMV approach computes a probit for every link in the model in lieu of the standardized path coefficient that researchers expect to see in structural equation models. Since there is no practical and mainstream approach for standardizing probits, this means that the researcher is unable to compare the relative strengths of the links in the models. Rather, the researcher is only able to observe the direction of the links in the models and thus determine whether a particular predictor is positive or negative relative to others. As a result, only the direction of each link will be included in the model depictions.

Model Optimization: From Confirmatory to Partially Exploratory

As described in Chapter 2, the operational MIPO structure was derived from bodies of literature that are indirectly related to the dependent variable at the center of focus in this book: the variation in the probability of supporting the U.S.-led war on terror. The reader might recall that, as of the date when the literature review reported in Chapter 2 was conducted, no studies had yet been carried out to empirically explain the variation in the support for the U.S.-led war on terror. Given the lack of prior empirical information specific to this dependent variable, it is possible that the hypothesized links among the proposed operational MIPO

components do not provide a complete picture of the interrelationships among these components as present in the data. After all, the operational MIPO structure solely hypothesized sequential links across the components resembling the flow of a simple causal chain. It is possible that the data might show the existence of direct effects between variables that were proposed as indirect antecedents of one another in Figure 3.1.

Taking into consideration the preceding in light of (a) the urgent need for practical information that can be used in the planning of U.S. public diplomacy strategies and (b) the desire to establish a starting point for theoretical development that future investigations can test and refine, it was decided that the analysis will go beyond simply confirming or not confirming the soundness of the proposed operational MIPO structure. It was decided that in the case that the results of the confirmatory SEM showed that the operational MIPO, as hypothesized, was not the best model for the data, a diagnosis of the model would be carried out in order to identify its optimal links as driven by the data. By going beyond testing the hypothesized operational MIPO, the analysis moves from being solely confirmatory to becoming partially exploratory. It becomes only partially exploratory since the order in which the operational MIPO components appear are not allowed to deviate from the theory-driven order identified earlier in Figure 3.1. Only the links among the operational MIPO components, and not the order of these components, are open to modification in an attempt to reach a model that is better than the one hypothesized in reflecting the interrelationships present in the data.

This optimization procedure is consistent with the literature on SEM: "When a hypothesized model is tested and the fit found to be inadequate, it is customary to proceed with post-hoc model-fitting to identify mis-specified parameters in the model" (Byrne, 1995, p. 152). This falls within what Hoyle and Panter (1995) call "alternative" models. As a result, when the goodness of fit statistics computed by Mplus showed that the model did not fit the data, after reporting such a finding, a model diagnosis was carried out by examining the Modification Indexes (see Sorbom, 1989; Joreskog, 1993). When considering the Modification Indexes, the guiding principle suggested by Byrne (1995) was adopted: "First and foremost, the researcher must determine whether the estimation of the targeted parameter is substantively meaningful" (p. 91).

Further, in order to arrive at cautious and conservative conclusions, only statistically significant links were included in the final version of a particular operational MIPO. Using statistical significance testing for evaluating a relationship between two variables normally raises the possibility of rejecting this bivariate relationship based on small sample results when such a relationship exists in the population from which the sample was drawn (see Kaplan, 1995). Given the large sample sizes being analyzed in this book, however, this is not a concern here. Thus, removing a link associated with a $p>.05$ simply makes the predictions of a particular operational MIPO more cautious and conservative.

Testing the Operational MIPO for all Seven Countries

Given all the concerns discussed above, it was decided that the most conservative and cautious approach of testing the MIPO would consist of the following:

1. First, test the overall model as specified by the operational MIPO using the entire sample size (i.e., all seven country data sets together).
2. If the results of this testing show that the overall model structure does not fit the data, then optimize the links among the operational MIPO components (as described earlier) to arrive at a model that does fit the data.
3. Once an overall model that fits the data is achieved, consider this overall model as preliminary and test it in each of the seven individual countries included in this book.
4. At the end of testing the preliminary model in all seven countries, determine which variables are shared across all seven country models and use only these variables in a final test involving the overall sample size.
5. The results of this final test would yield the final overall operational MIPO. This final operational MIPO would embody the theoretical model that can be generalized to the entire data set and against which the results of future investigations can be compared.

Patterns in the Public Opinion of Muslims

The section below provides an analysis of the trends present in each of the variables included in the operational Model of International Public Opinion (MIPO) as they relate to the overall sample size of the seven countries (N=3343).[1]

As was noted earlier, the data provided here are from 2002 and this researcher is aware that the response patterns are likely to have changed since that time due to the various international conflicts that have occurred since 2002. The data, however, are still very useful since the focus in this book is on the interrelationships among the various model components rather than on the trends that exists within each of these components. While the variation within each component is likely to fluctuate over time, this author believes that the interrelationships among components are not subject to such fluctuation. Thus, the purpose of providing the descriptive analyses below and throughout this book is not meant for estimating descriptive population parameters. Rather, the descriptive analyses are meant to depict the trends and patterns in the variation within each component of the MIPO so that the reader can understand what the input was for a particular model testing procedure.

[1] Because some of the variables included in Figure 3.1 were not measured in Egypt and because the correlation matrix computed for the entire sample uses a listwise deletion of missing data, the Egyptian respondents will not be included in the overall analysis reported in this chapter. An analysis for Egypt is provided in Chapter 5 and Egypt is also included in the analyses conducted in Chapter 11.

Demographics

Figure 3.2

Gender



Age

Age (Years)	*Percent*
18-24	28%
25-34	29%
35-44	21%
45-54	12%
55-64	7%
65 and older	3%

n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.2 shows that the total sample of Muslim respondents analyzed consists of 57 percent male and 43 percent female. Almost a third (28%) of the respondents are between the ages of 18 and 24, about a third (29%) are between the ages of 25 and 34, one fifth (21%) are 35 to 44 years old, and the remaining 22 percent are 45 years or older.

Figure 3.3



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

With respect to level of education, Figure 3.3 shows that approximately one third (29%) of the sample completed secondary school, 18 percent attended college, but only 12 percent completed it. Although a fifth (19%) of respondents in this sample completed primary school, another 19 percent never finished secondary school. The remainder of respondents never completed primary school or received no schooling at all.

Predispositions

Traditional Islamic Values: The role of Islam in politics

Figure 3.4



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.4 shows that the majority (71%) of Muslims in our sample expressed traditional Islamic values about the role of Islam in politics. Most believe Islam should play a role in the political life of their country.

Figure 3.5

Women's Values

Indicator 1 of 2: "Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with the statement: Women should be able to work outside the home."



Figure 3.6

Women's Values

Indicator 2 of 2: "Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with the statement: Women should have the right to decide if they wear a veil."



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that the vast majority of Muslim respondents in our sample do *not* exhibit conservative beliefs about the role of women, with most expressing that women should have the right to work outside the home and choose whether or not to veil. The total sample of Muslims, thus, express liberal values concerning the role of women in society.

Openness to Global Exchanges

Figure 3.7



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.8

Openness to Global Exchanges 2

Indicator 2 of 4: "What about faster communication and greater travel between the people of (survey country) and people in other countries?"



Figure 3.9

Openness to Global Exchanges (3 of 4)

"How do you feel about the world becoming more connected through greater economic trade and faster communication-do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad thing for your country?"



n=3343

Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.10

Openness to Global Exchanges 4

Indicator 4 of 4: "Now thinking about your family, do you think the growing trade and business ties between our country and other countries are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad for you and your family?"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

In Figures 3.7-3.10, the trend present in the four indicators of openness to global exchanges shows that the vast majority of Muslim respondents in the overall sample exhibit openness to global exchanges with regard to growing trade and business ties, faster communication and greater travel between the people in their country and people in other countries, and enhanced global connectivity.

Receptiveness to Imported Media

Figure 3.11

Receptiveness to Imported Media 1

Indicator 1 of 2: What about the way movies, TV and music from different parts of the world are now available in (country)-do you think this is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?



Figure 3.12

Receptiveness to Imported Media 2

Indicator 2 of 2: "And do you think that having the opportunity to watch movies and TV and listen to music from different parts of the world is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad for you and your family?"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show that the majority of Muslim respondents in the overall sample are receptive to imported media. Most think that the availability of movies, TV, and music from other parts of the world is good for their country and family.

Media Exposure

Exposure to International News Networks

Figure 3.13



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.13 shows that most Muslim respondents in the overall sample do *not* watch international news networks.

Figure 3.14

Likelihood of Consuming U.S. Imported Entertainment Media

"Which is closer to your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television."



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

According to Figure 3.14, the Muslim respondents analyzed in the overall sample are equally split with regard to whether or not they like American music, movies, and television. Thus, approximately half of these respondents are likely to be consumers of imported U.S. entertainment media.

Beliefs

The U.S. Ignores Other Countries' Interests

Figure 3.15

Belief that the U.S. Does Not Take Into Account Other Countries' Interests

"In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country)?"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.15 shows that the majority of Muslim respondents in the overall sample (65%) believe that the United States does *not* take into account the interests of countries like their own when making international policy decisions.

Figure 3.16

Belief that Terrorism is a Problem for One's Own Country

"Here is a list of things that may be a problem in our country … Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all: terrorism"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.16 depicts that the majority of Muslim respondents in the overall sample (76%) believe that terrorism is a big problem for their country.

Attitudes

Feelings about Terrorism

Figure 3.17

Attitude toward Terrorism

"Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that no matter what the reason this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.17 shows that over half of the Muslim respondents in the overall sample (63%) express a negative attitude toward suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets as a means of defending Islam. Most believe that such violence is not justified to defend Islam.

Figure 3.18



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.18 depicts that over half of the Muslim respondents in the overall sample (55%) hold an unfavorable feeling toward the United States.

Figure 3.19

Support for the U.S.-led fight Versus Terror

"And which comes closer to describing your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism?"



n=3343
Source: PGAP Dataset, 2002

Figure 3.19 shows that the majority of Muslim respondents in the overall sample (66%) opposes the U.S.-led war on terror.

The Muslim respondents in the overall sample are relatively young (the majority being under the age of 35), relatively educated (approximately half of whom have a secondary education or higher), are somewhat liberal in their Islamic values about the role of women, while being very traditional in their Islamic values about the role of religion in politics, are overwhelmingly open to global exchanges, fairly receptive to imported media, approximately half of whom are likely to be exposed to imported U.S. entertainment media, most of whom believe that terrorism is a problem for their countries, and approximately half of whom believe that terrorism cannot be justified as a defense against Islam. Given the preceding, how then can one explain their overwhelming belief that the United States ignores their interests when formulating its foreign policies, the fact that over half of these respondents hold a negative attitude

toward the United States, and the fact that a majority opposes the U.S.-led war on terror?

Testing the Operational MIPO

The operational MIPO, as depicted in Figure 3.1, was subjected to SEM testing using the data for all the countries where all the components in Figure 3.1 were measured (N=3343). The results showed that the model, as specified, was not a good fit for the data (CFI=.85, RMSEA=.06). The operational MIPO was optimized and this process resulted in the preliminary overall model depicted in Figure 3.20.



Figure 3.20

A Preliminary Model of International Muslim Public Opinion about the U.S.-Led War on Terror

As was noted earlier, the objective of the optimization process is not to change the order in which the model components appear, but rather to paint a more complete picture of the interrelationships among these components. As a result of this optimization process, the new goodness of fit statistics became ideal (CFI=.95, RMSEA=.04).

Given the partially exploratory nature of the optimization process, and taking into account the potential introduction of Type I errors in this model as a result of the very large sample size on which it is based, it was decided that the optimized model will not be interpreted at this stage. Instead, it will need to be tested in each of the seven countries individually to determine the stability of its predictions across countries. Using the relatively smaller samples of individual countries will reduce the bias of the overall large sample toward achieving statistically significant results even when relationships are very small in size. After such testing, a comparison across the individual country results will better enable the researcher to reach a final conclusion concerning the worth of the overall model's contributions toward the development of an international public opinion theory concerning the U.S.-led war on terror.

Providing a Social Context for Understanding the Interrelationships Depicted by the Model

The operational MIPO, as depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.20, currently lacks the social context that Almond (1950) stated a researcher needs to take into account in order to truly understand the variation in public opinion. One advantage of testing the operational MIPO in each country separately is that this social context can be better portrayed for each of the seven countries individually than it can be described at the aggregate level. The social context that exists within a given country is, of course, a very broad concept. A researcher needs to focus on those aspects of a country's social context that would be most relevant for understanding its population's perceptions of the United States. These aspects of the social context are conceived as qualitative antecedents of that population's inferences about the U.S.-led war

on terror. In Chapter 2, Figure 2.2 depicted that opinion about social concept A is a function of the inference about social concept A that, in turn, is a function of the schema structure of social concept A. Altogether, the schema components are a function of prior information acquired about social concept A.

In this case, what prior information about the U.S. can be reasonably assumed to have been acquired by the population of a particular country? Such prior information is most likely to exist in the recent histories of these countries and their dealings with the U.S. and more generally the West, with which the U.S. is closely associated (Klineberg, 1964). The focus here is on those aspects of a country's recent history that most likely get passed on to the new generations from previous generations in the form of oral histories, as in interactions with grandparents, parents etc. or through formal education as in textbooks, teachers etc. Such experiences would constitute person-mediated perceptions and biases (positive and negative) toward entities that are not local. It is reasonable to propose that the most vivid history is that which is recent. Hence the importance of documenting recent history involving Western government involvement in the countries being studied, since it is this recent history that will more likely be still on top of mind among the inhabitants of each of the seven countries.

The collective memory of a particular country's dealings with the West will be estimated indirectly and qualitatively. To estimate this collective memory, each of the individual country chapters that follow will begin with a chronology that focuses especially on Western involvement in that country throughout the last century. For the sake of consistency in the quality of information available about each country, and for the avoidance of any anti-Western biases that might be present in some historical accounts, whenever possible, this chronology will be extracted from the country studies commissioned by the Federal Research Division of the U.S. Library of Congress (Federal Research Division, 2006). These thoroughly researched country studies (CS) are described as presenting "a description and analysis of the historical setting and the social, economic, political, and national security systems and institutions of countries throughout the world. The series examines the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors" (Federal Research Division, 2006). In the case where a source supplemental to the CS was used fill a gap in the information found in the CS, such source is cited in the text.

The chronologies extracted from the Country Studies are not meant to be comprehensive accounts of these countries' histories during the twentieth century. Instead, a historical event was included in the chronology if it satisfied one of the four following criteria:

1. The event involves the particular country and a Western country? (e.g., invasions, wars, etc.); or
2. The event describes the origins of more contemporary occurrences that exhibit popular sentiment toward the West (e.g., the rise of religious fundamentalism in that country as linked to recent attacks on tourists in that country); or
3. The event prominently reflects the sentiment of some group that exists within that country toward the West (e.g., attacks on Western businesses and tourists); or
4. The event provides a context for the criteria listed above.

The twentieth century period (or thereabout) is chosen since events that have taken place during that time are most likely to have a recency effect on the collective memory of a particular country's population and thus are likely to be important components of the frames with which members of this population perceive the West, including the U.S.

In addition to extracting historical chronologies, another aspect of a particular country's social context that is important to understand is the availability of information about the U.S. Thus, such aspects as the availability of news media, U.S. products, trends in immigration to the U.S., tourism to the U.S., U.S. restaurants, and USAID projects will also be described for each individual country whenever such information is available.

All of the above constitute potential unmeasured antecedents in the MIPO and thus will help the reader understand the context in which the interrelationships among the MIPO components are taking place.

The following chapters focus on testing the MIPO within the social contexts of each of the seven countries chosen for inclusion in this study: Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

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Index

Abdou, 417
Abdoulaye, 418
Aceh, 312, 326
ADF, 93, 94
Aegean, 216
Afghan, 273
Africa, 27, 86, 172, 186, 217, 365, 366, 369, 372, 373, 374, 378, 411, 412, 418, 420, 423, 454
Agency, 9, 11, 14, 28, 130, 136, 140, 141, 185, 189, 191, 233, 235, 276, 279, 281, 320, 328, 332, 334, 377, 380, 382, 422, 425, 427, 481, 483, 484, 485, 493, 497
AGOA, 420
AIDS, 366, 384
AIT, 378
al'Qaeda, 325
Albanians, 21
Algeria, 217
algorithms, 93
Angola, 373
Ankara, 216, 223
Antara, 328
Arab, 7, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 36, 37, 62, 83, 123, 125, 126, 136, 172, 175, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183, 184, 186, 219, 476, 477, 480, 483, 484, 492, 497, 498
Arabia, 6, 28, 128, 182
Arabic, 12, 14, 23, 26, 27, 30, 123, 135, 136, 173, 185, 186, 217, 484, 486
Arabsat, 136
Arafat, 127
archipelago, 309, 310, 314, 316
Armenian, 123, 217, 225
ASEAN, 320
Asia, 16, 27, 86, 216, 217, 218, 260, 267, 268, 270, 309, 321, 322, 326, 328
Assyrians, 123
Aswan, 178
Ataturk, 219
Athens, 130
Australia, 325, 370

B

Babylonians, 123
Baghdad, 267
Bali, 311, 325, 326, 362
Balkans, 21
Bangladesh, 269
Beijing, 319
Beirut, 12, 31, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 485
Belize, 64
Bengal, 266
Berlin, 19, 217
Biafran, 372, 373
Bonaparte, 173
Britain, 34, 37, 125, 128, 130, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 217, 223, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 269, 273, 319, 325, 368, 369, 372
British, 23, 37, 119, 125, 133, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 219, 227, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 312, 314, 315, 316, 318, 326, 329, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 412
Brookings, 11, 37, 83, 477, 497, 498
Bulgaria, 216, 217, 375
Burma, 371
Bush, George, 28, 133, 183, 226, 419, 420

C

Canaanites, 123
Canada, 36, 37, 370, 418, 498
Canal, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181

Carter, Jimmy, 182, 224, 372
Catholic, 415
causal, 55, 56, 60, 74, 96
causality, 45
censorship, 182, 184, 229, 276, 421, 492
China, 36, 80, 260, 272, 318, 319, 320
Chinese, 267, 268, 320
CIA, 130, 169, 213, 257, 307, 362, 409, 453
CNBC, 154
CNN, 136, 154, 186, 202, 230, 245, 294, 329, 348, 378, 396, 423, 440, 492, 497
colonial, 262, 263, 310, 311, 312, 313, 321, 323, 366, 368, 369, 370, 372, 415
colonialism, 261, 366
colonialist, 313
colonies, 177, 262, 412, 416
colonization, 314
Congress, 2, 12, 13, 14, 34, 37, 117, 183, 220, 224, 263, 265, 266, 267, 477, 495, 498
Congressional, 7, 8, 11, 12, 34, 37, 477, 498
Constantinople, 217
Coptic, 182
Cuba, 59
Cyprus, 136, 217, 223, 228
Czechoslovakia, 177

D

Dakar, 412, 415, 416, 420, 422
Damascus, 219
dartboard, 479, 480, 486
DeGaulle, Charles, 416
democratic, 219, 325, 417, 481, 489
dichotomous, 93, 120
dichotomy, 11
dictatorial, 219
dictatorship, 221, 273
Diouf, 414, 417, 418
diplomacy, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 77, 81, 96, 257, 307, 363, 368, 418, 454, 456, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 483, 485, 486, 490, 491, 496, 497, 498, 499
diplomat, 130
diplomatic, 179, 180, 182, 318
diplomatically, 179
diplomats, 7, 9, 131
disarm, 315
Dubai, 28, 486
Dunyaa, 422

E

Egypt, 1, 12, 30, 86, 98, 118, 126, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 221, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 500, 504, 505
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 126, 221
embassy, 129, 270, 318, 325
Emirates, 12
empire, 124, 175, 217, 412
endogenous, 94
enemy, 56, 184, 228, 326
enlightenment, 54
enslavement, 366
entertainment, 14, 52, 59, 63, 69, 70, 71, 72, 89, 108, 113, 136, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 210, 212, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 304, 305, 306, 328, 358, 360, 361, 406, 408, 409, 450, 452, 453, 454, 458, 459, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 469, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 482, 491, 493
environment, 46, 55, 63, 227, 324, 489
Ethiopian, 371
ethnic, 21, 178, 313, 325, 366, 370, 371, 466
ethnicity, 21, 317
ethnocentricism, 55
ethnocentrism, 72
EU, 133, 169, 227, 228, 419
Eurasia, 27
Euronews, 136
Europe, 27, 61, 127, 136, 186, 216, 217, 218, 219, 224, 231, 454, 480
European, 21, 136, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 261, 310, 311, 313, 323, 326, 366, 368, 370, 419
Europeans, 261, 315, 412, 415
Eutelsat, 136

F

factor, 4, 94, 119, 120, 465, 466, 475
fascist, 175
fashion, 42, 220
Fatimids, 173
federation, 372
foreign, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30, 31, 32, 36, 40, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 113, 123, 129, 133, 134, 140, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 175, 176, 184, 189, 204, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 220, 221, 222, 226, 228, 229, 230, 233, 253, 255, 257, 267, 268, 274, 276, 279, 304, 305, 307, 312, 318, 320, 322, 323, 327, 332, 357, 358, 360, 361, 362, 363, 373, 375, 380, 405, 406, 407, 408, 410, 412, 416, 418, 421, 425, 449, 450, 452, 454, 458, 461, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 469, 471, 473, 474, 475, 476, 479, 480, 481, 483, 484, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495, 496, 497, 498
FOX, 329
fundamental, 175, 490
fundamentalism, 56, 118, 124, 173, 218, 311
fundamentalist, 183, 270, 271, 311

G

Gallup, 5, 40, 61
Gambia, 417
Gandhi, 264, 265
GAO, 7, 8, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 476, 485, 486, 497, 498
Gemayel, 131
German, 19, 60, 61, 176, 219, 369
Ghanaians, 373
global, 2, 5, 10, 12, 13, 18, 83, 105, 113, 128, 152, 200, 210, 213, 243, 253, 256, 292, 319, 322, 324, 345, 393, 438, 469, 470, 471, 473, 480, 481, 490, 491, 492, 493
globalization, 16, 485
Greece, 216, 223, 227
Greek, 178, 217, 223

H

Habibie, 325
Hague, 318
hegemony, 483
heuristic, 58, 421, 474
heuristics, 49, 50, 134, 184, 274, 327, 375, 494
Hezbollah, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 169, 170
Hindu, 261, 263, 265, 267, 273, 310
Hinduism, 261, 310
Hollywood, 12, 31, 139, 485
homeland, 176, 491
homogenous, 70, 466
Honduras, 375
humanitarian, 15, 18, 133, 327, 421
humanitarianism, 315
humiliating, 420
hypotheses, 76, 77, 165, 211, 254, 304, 359, 406, 451, 462
hypothesis, 70, 83
hypothesize, 56, 74
hypothesized, 75, 94, 95, 96, 166, 167, 212, 255, 256, 305, 306, 360, 361, 407, 408, 452, 463, 464, 465

I

Iceland, 64, 82, 258, 307, 363, 454
idealistic, 487
ideological, 314, 326
ideologues, 15
ideology, 56, 268, 320, 417
illusion, 174
image, 12, 21, 24, 43, 45, 47, 56, 226, 480
IMF, 318, 418
immigrant, 370
Immigration, 137, 170, 187, 214, 231, 258, 277, 308, 329, 364, 378, 410, 423, 455
Imperialism, 79, 168, 257, 307, 319, 362, 409, 453
imperialist, 487
India, 59, 80, 174, 260, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 276, 366
Indies, 310, 313, 314
Indochina, 322

Indonesia, 1, 6, 86, 118, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 345, 350, 351, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 500,뒤510, 511
Indonesian, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 334, 337, 338, 339, 341, 343, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361
Inflation, 129
Infonews, 329
inspiration, 228
inspire, 489
Intelsat, 136
interfere, 263
interference, 126, 262, 310
intergovernmental, 140, 189, 234, 279, 332, 381, 425
intergroup, 69, 83
international, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 30, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 98, 107, 109, 116, 133, 136, 146, 154, 156, 165, 166, 167, 170, 176, 183, 186, 195, 202, 204, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 224, 225, 231, 237, 245, 246, 253, 254, 255, 256, 259, 267, 270, 271, 276, 285, 294, 296, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 326, 327, 328, 338, 348, 350, 359, 360, 373, 374, 385, 396, 398, 407, 408, 410, 412, 417, 419, 431, 440, 442, 451, 452, 455, 456, 462, 463, 464, 465, 467, 469, 470, 472, 473, 477, 482, 483, 484, 485, 487, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495, 496, 498
internationalism, 58, 72
Internet, 16, 18, 35
invade, 178
invasion, 128, 174, 178, 183, 227, 414
IOM, 415
Iran, 136, 221, 226, 260, 324
Iranian, 82, 132, 214
Iraq, 183, 221, 226, 231
isolate, 24
isolationism, 55, 72
Israel, 12, 17, 122, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 168, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 221
Israeli, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 176, 181, 182, 481
Istanbul, 217, 227
Italian, 128, 375
Italy, 128, 418
Ivoire, 412
Ivory, 412

J

Jakarta, 310, 318, 319, 322, 323, 325, 327
Japan, 313, 320, 321, 418
Japanese, 313, 314, 315
Java, 310, 312, 313, 315, 316
Javanese, 310, 313, 321
Jawaharlal, 264
Jazeera, 12, 15, 136, 186, 483, 484, 493, 497
Jordan, 126, 179, 221, 324
Jumhuriyah, 185

K

Karachi, 272, 273, 275
Kashmir, 266, 269, 272, 276
Kemal, 219
Kemalism, 220
Kissinger, 181
Korean, 220
Kosovars, 21
Kurdish, 217, 225, 226, 227, 231
Kurdistan, 227, 231
Kurds, 227, 229
Kuwait, 6, 183

L

Lagos, 376, 377, 378
Lahore, 275
Lebanese, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 412, 447

Lebanon, 1, 86, 118, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 156, 157, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 414, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 500, 502, 503
linguistic, 69

M

Malay, 314
Malaysia, 309, 318, 319, 320, 322
Malaysian, 319
Mamluks, 173
Mandarin, 329
Maronite, 125, 131
Marxism, 313
Mauritania, 411, 412, 415, 418
Mecca, 270
Media, 17, 35, 69, 71, 72, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 106, 107, 108, 134, 136, 153, 154, 155, 165, 168, 184, 186, 202, 203, 211, 229, 230, 244, 245, 253, 254, 257, 275, 276, 293, 294, 295, 304, 307, 327, 328, 346, 348, 349, 359, 362, 376, 377, 394, 396, 397, 407, 409, 422, 423, 439, 440, 441, 451, 453, 457, 459, 461, 462, 470, 476
Mediterranean, 122, 172, 216
methodology, 77, 93
military, 17, 24, 55, 56, 126, 128, 131, 133, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 312, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 323, 372, 374, 412, 417, 421, 487
militiamen, 128
Morocco, 371
Musharraf, Pervez, 273
Muslim, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 61, 62, 70, 75, 76, 77, 81, 85, 92, 98, 99, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 166, 167, 168, 175, 181, 182, 183, 211, 212, 217, 222, 254, 255, 256, 257, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268, 273, 305, 307, 310, 320, 359, 360, 361, 363, 368, 407, 408, 414, 451, 452, 454, 456, 458, 460, 464, 465, 466, 472, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 496, 497, 498
Mustafa, 219
Mustaqbal, 135

N

Nahar, 135
Napoleon, 173
Nasser, 177, 178, 179, 180
national, 15, 18, 21, 23, 55, 57, 63, 79, 83, 117, 175, 226, 230, 258, 268, 271, 307, 308, 313, 314, 315, 316, 327, 328, 360, 363, 376, 377, 378, 422, 423, 454, 492, 495
nationalism, 311, 370
nationalist, 174, 175, 219, 312, 313, 315, 370
NATO, 220, 223
Nazi, 175
Nehru, 264
Neocolonialism, 319
Netherlands, 36, 314, 316, 320, 322, 323, 498
News Corp, 276
newspaper, 14, 17, 60, 61, 212
NGOs, 12
Niger, 412
Nigeria, 1, 6, 86, 118, 362, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 386, 388, 398, 399, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 473, 500, 512, 513
Nixon, Richard, 179
Noopolitik, 491
NTA, 377
NTV, 230
nuclear, 55, 56, 72, 81, 180, 270, 271, 272, 273, 463, 476

O

Obasanjo, 373, 374
OECD, 224

opinion, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 20, 22, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 90, 116, 140, 145, 146, 166, 167, 168, 171, 189, 195, 205, 212, 214, 234, 237, 255, 256, 257, 279, 285, 286, 306, 307, 332, 338, 339, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 381, 385, 386, 408, 410, 425, 431, 445, 454, 455, 456, 463, 464, 465, 476, 477, 493, 496
Ottoman, 124, 217, 218, 219

P

Pakistan, 1, 86, 118, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 288, 296, 297, 305, 306, 307, 308, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 500, 508, 509
Pakistani, 260, 262, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 284, 285, 286, 288, 290, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306
Palestine, 126, 127, 176, 179, 371
Palestinian, 126, 127, 129, 131, 481
paternalistic, 487
patriotism, 56, 72
PEMRA, 276
Pentagon, 480
Persian, 13, 26, 183, 225, 261
Phalangist, 127
Philippines, 320
PLO, 126, 127
Portugal, 323, 372
Portuguese, 261, 310, 313, 314, 321, 366, 412
probability, 1, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 161, 163, 166, 168, 207, 211, 212, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 301, 303, 305, 306, 355, 357, 359, 360, 361, 403, 407, 408, 409, 447, 449, 451, 452, 453, 459, 461, 463, 464, 465, 466, 474, 482, 486
probit, 95, 163, 209, 252, 303, 357, 405, 449
propaganda, 10, 11, 36, 372, 482
protectorate, 175
Protestantism, 310
psychological, 4, 10, 11, 42, 80
psychology, 3, 9, 46
Ptolemies, 173
Punjab, 266

Q

Qaeda, 273, 325
Qana, 131
questionnaire, 86

R

radio, 8, 14, 18, 27, 60, 134, 136, 184, 229, 274, 275, 327, 375, 376, 378, 420, 421, 475, 482, 485, 486
Radiodiffusion, 422, 423
realpolitik, 490, 491
rebellion, 261
rebels, 318
receptive, 107, 113, 154, 164, 165, 167, 168, 201, 210, 213, 245, 253, 256, 294, 304, 306, 347, 357, 358, 360, 361, 395, 406, 408, 440, 453, 459, 462, 464
relationship, 47, 52, 57, 60, 62, 97, 136, 166, 167, 212, 220, 222, 223, 226, 255, 256, 269, 303, 305, 306, 316, 319, 321, 360, 361, 372, 405, 407, 417, 452, 463, 465, 466, 471, 472, 494
religion, 21, 39, 87, 113, 220, 264, 317, 361
religious, 56, 118, 123, 124, 127, 129, 173, 182, 218, 263, 311, 325, 366, 367, 378, 423
republic, 177, 316, 317, 415, 416
republican, 316, 317
Restaurant, 139, 170, 188, 214, 233, 258, 279, 308, 331
Russia, 125, 133, 169, 217
Russian, 219

S

Saad, 133
Sabah, 229

SABC, 396
sabotage, 271
Sabra, 128, 169
Sadat, 15, 180, 181, 182
Safir, 135
Saharan, 366, 418
Saudi, 6, 28, 128, 136, 182, 183, 186
Sawa, 19, 27, 482, 486
schema, 3, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 70, 71, 117, 456, 473, 474, 495
schemata, 56, 79
Scheufele, 61, 81, 255, 257, 305, 307, 363, 452, 454, 464, 476
security, 18, 25, 117, 127, 132, 176, 226, 268, 321, 417, 491
Senegal, 1, 86, 118, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 423, 424, 425, 427, 429, 430, 431, 434, 442, 443, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 500, 514, 515
Senegalese, 411, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 427, 429, 430, 431, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453
Singapore, 320
Soviet, 55, 56, 79, 80, 126, 130, 169, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 213, 220, 226, 257, 267, 268, 270, 307, 318, 319, 362, 363, 372, 373, 410, 454, 476
stereotype, 18
Suharto, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327
Sukarno, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321
sultan, 218
Sumatra, 310, 311, 312, 316, 318, 326
Surabaya, 315
Susilo, 325
Syria, 9, 122, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 169, 179, 180, 216, 221
Syrian, 127, 131, 132, 133, 169, 171

T

Taiwan, 36, 64, 83
Taliban, 272
television, 8, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 27, 28, 52, 60, 61, 63, 70, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89, 108, 134, 136, 155, 168, 170, 184, 186, 203, 214, 229, 230, 231, 246, 255, 257, 258, 259, 274, 275, 277, 295, 305, 307, 308, 327, 329, 349, 360, 362, 363, 364, 375, 376, 378, 397,띄409, 410, 421, 423, 441, 452, 453, 454, 455, 464, 475, 476, 482, 486, 497
terrorism, 6, 61, 73, 76, 77, 89, 90, 91, 110, 113, 132, 157, 166, 168, 207, 211, 222, 247, 254, 256, 297, 304, 305, 306, 326, 351, 359, 361, 399, 400, 406, 407, 408, 409, 419, 443, 451, 453, 462, 464, 466, 469
terrorist, 2, 5, 6, 7, 129, 130, 131, 183, 222, 325, 419
Thailand, 320
Trinidad, 64, 82
Tripoli, 126
Truman, 220
Tunisia, 217
Turk, 230
Turkey, 1, 21, 86, 118, 136, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 246, 247, 253, 255, 257, 258, 457, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 500, 506, 507
Turkish, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256
TV5, 136, 440
TWA, 130
typology, 479, 483

U

UPS, 416
Urdu, 261, 275
USAID, 12, 28, 30, 118, 141, 144, 170, 191, 193, 194, 214, 235, 258, 281, 284, 308, 326, 334, 336, 337, 364, 382, 384, 410, 427, 429, 455, 481, 484, 488
USIA, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 20, 21, 34, 37
USSR, 59

V

Venezuela, 59
Vietnam, 54, 81
VOA, 12, 396

W

Washington, 12, 14, 18, 20, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 82, 83, 120, 133, 170, 214, 258, 308, 364, 410, 418, 420, 455, 476, 477, 497, 498, 499

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